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  INTRODUCTION   
How authority should be allocated as between the states 
and federal government is a topic of perennial debate. The 
vogue in federalism scholarship today is to celebrate a model of 
overlapping state-federal authority that has been labeled in 
varying ways as “cooperative,” “polyphonic,” “dialectic,” “inter-
active,” “intersystemic,” and even at times “uncooperative” (but 
in a good way).1 For simplicity, I will use the label “cooperative 
federalism.” Whatever the moniker, the basic idea is that a va-
riety of benefits can flow from having multiple layers of gov-
ernment concurrently address an area of regulatory concern. 
Recent focus has been placed on the benefits of concurrent en-
forcement authority in particular—i.e., the ability of state regu-
lators to either directly enforce federal laws, or to enforce state 
laws that substantively and jurisdictionally overlap with feder-
al laws.2
 
 1. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 7 (2009) 
[hereinafter SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM]; Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialecti-
cal Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868 (2006); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 
(2009); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 243, 243 (2005) [hereinafter Schapiro, Interactive Federalism]; 
see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT 225 (2008).  
 This spike in interest in concurrent enforcement may 
 2. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 56–57 (2010); Margaret H. 
Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 699–704 
(2011); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concur-
rent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 53 (2011). 
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be attributable to controversial provisions in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 which 
authorize state regulators to enforce the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s rules, while also preserving their authority 
to enforce more pro-consumer state laws.3 But state and federal 
regulators share enforcement authority in numerous legal are-
as beyond consumer protection, including antitrust, securities 
fraud, and wide swaths of environmental and criminal law.4 
Moreover, a debate currently rages over the ability of states to 
aid in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.5
The benefit of concurrent enforcement most emphasized in 
this recent literature is the ability of state regulators to remedy 
under-enforcement by potentially captured federal agencies.
 The topic 
is thus one of broad public policy significance. 
6 
Other heralded benefits include the additional resources and 
local knowledge that state enforcement brings to the table, as 
well as the increased opportunities for citizen influence.7 The 
costs tend to be given only cursory attention. But that ground 
has been well trodden in the past by proponents of “competitive 
federalism.”8 Competitive federalists favor granting states ex-
clusive authority in regulatory areas where inter-jurisdictional 
competition is believed to lead to better government, and grant-
ing the federal government exclusive authority in regulatory 
areas where a uniform national policy is desirable9
 
 3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 
—more in 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see Barkow, supra note 2, at 75–76 (dis-
cussing the political debate over this “hotly contested issue”); Widman & Cox, 
supra note 2, at 60 (same). 
 4. See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS EN-
FORCEMENT 109 (4th ed. 1986) (criminal); AM. BAR ASS’N, THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
HANDBOOK 494 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998) (envi-
ronmental); infra note 88 (antitrust); infra Part III (securities). 
 5. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (ruling on 
preemption claims directed towards Arizona’s controversial S.B. 1070); Gabriel 
J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Im-
migration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253–55 (2011) (discuss-
ing copycat bills recently adopted in many other states). 
 6. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.2–3. 
 8. For a discussion of the competitive challenge to cooperative federal-
ism, see John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: 
A Theory of Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 87–114 
(Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991). 
 9. For the classic works in this area, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), and WALLACE E. 
OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust 
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line with the “dual federalism” that reigned in the pre-New 
Deal era.10 They emphasize the potential for concurrent en-
forcement to create wasteful redundancies in enforcement ex-
penditures, distort policy goals, and undermine democratic ac-
countability.11
Both sides of this rather polarized debate make important 
contributions. But the discussion is too abstract. Unless one 
takes the position that more (or less) government is an unquali-
fied good unto itself, concurrent enforcement cannot sensibly be 
applauded (or derided) at a trans-substantive level. In some 
regulatory areas, the benefits of shared enforcement authority 
may outweigh the costs; in others, the opposite may be true. 
Context is critical. While scholars have recognized the need for 
case studies to evaluate concurrent enforcement’s desirability 
in particular regulatory settings,
 
12
 
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 33–35, 38 (1983) (dis-
cussing the pre-conditions for efficient interjurisdictional competition and 
identifying regulatory problems that require a national solution); Richard A. 
Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147–
48 (1992) (same). 
 missing from the existing 
literature is clear guidance on what factors should be looked to 
in conducting the necessary cost-benefit calculation. Without 
such guidance, principled distinctions between concurrent en-
forcement authority in disparate fields like environmental pro-
tection and immigration law are difficult to draw, and the risk 
exists that case studies will simply weigh the rather amor-
phous costs and benefits of concurrent enforcement in whatever 
way supports the author’s political preferences. This Article 
seeks to bring some much needed discipline to debates over 
concurrent state-federal enforcement by providing a systematic 
account of the variables that will influence its desirability in 
different regulatory settings. To illustrate the significance of 
these variables, the Article also provides an empirically 
 10. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases decided in this era holding 
that state and federal power operate in exclusive realms, see Stephen 
Gardbaum, The Breadth vs. the Depth of Congress’s Commerce Power: The Cu-
rious History of Preemption During the Lochner Era, in FEDERAL PREEMP-
TION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 48, 57–62 (Richard A. Epstein & 
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 2, at 79 (“Future research will need to 
assess the strengths and tradeoffs . . . [in] specific regulatory contexts.”); 
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1308 (observing that “[c]ase studies 
are likely to be especially important, as every administrative scheme is differ-
ent,” and “would be particularly helpful in adding needed texture to the story 
about states” offered). 
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grounded case study of one of the longest standing, and most 
fraught, areas of concurrent state-federal enforcement: securi-
ties fraud enforcement against nationally traded firms. 
This Article’s first contribution is to identify the contextual 
factors that influence the magnitude of the costs and benefits 
produced by concurrent state-federal enforcement. These fac-
tors are discussed in Part II, and first among them is the pur-
pose of federal intervention in the regulatory area under exam-
ination. Debates over the desirability of concurrent 
enforcement between persons with different views on the pur-
pose of federal intervention—or on the wisdom of having the 
federal government involved in the particular regulatory area 
at all—will necessarily be incoherent. Only common answers to 
these first order federalism questions can give way to reasoned 
debate on the second order question of optimal enforcement de-
sign. For example, the case for concurrent state enforcement is 
much easier to make when federal laws are warranted as a 
means for preserving a base level of national rights, or of pre-
venting so-called “races to the bottom,” than when federal laws 
are warranted as a means for dealing with interstate externali-
ties generated by state-level regulation. In the former cases, 
states truly can use their enforcement authority to innovate 
and experiment “without risk to the rest of the country,”13
Several structural factors will influence the costs and bene-
fits of shared enforcement authority when interstate externali-
ties justify federal intervention. As fleshed out in Part II.B, 
these include the breadth of the substantive prohibition being 
enforced, whether states are enforcing federal law or analogous 
state laws, the number of states with overlapping jurisdiction, 
and the type of safeguards (if any) that are built into the con-
current enforcement regime. These easily observable factors 
can help predict concurrent enforcement’s potential in different 
regulatory settings. For example, if only one state has concur-
 be-
cause their enforcement policies do not threaten to distort na-
tional policy goals. Moreover, the lines of democratic accounta-
bility remain fairly clear. When federal intervention is 
warranted to deal with interstate externalities, by contrast, 
policy distortion and democratic concerns take on greater prom-
inence. Concurrent enforcement may still have a beneficial role 
to play, but to determine whether this is likely to be the case 
requires a careful analysis of additional context-specific factors. 
 
 13. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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rent jurisdiction to enforce a fairly narrow federal law, subject 
to federal oversight, the potential costs are much smaller than 
if numerous states share unfettered jurisdiction to enforce 
broad state laws that overlap with, but may vary from, federal 
law. 
If these structural features suggest that concurrent en-
forcement may create significant costs, an assessment of the 
enforcement behavior of federal and state regulators becomes 
essential to determining concurrent enforcement’s desirability. 
Does the federal agency with enforcement authority err on the 
side of under-enforcement (or would it if granted an enforce-
ment monopoly)? If the answer is no, state enforcement is not 
needed as a means to correct for lax federal efforts—the prima-
ry benefit of concurrent state enforcement stressed in recent 
literature. Even if the federal regulator does (or would) under-
enforce, or there is empirical uncertainty as to whether that is 
the case, state enforcement will be desirable only if it does more 
good (by correcting for this tendency or producing other bene-
fits) than harm (by distorting legitimate policy goals or produc-
ing other costs). Thus, it is also critical to understand how state 
regulators actually use their concurrent enforcement authority. 
Theory supports different hypotheses about how states 
might behave, with different implications for the desirability of 
concurrent enforcement. Consistent with positive accounts of 
concurrent enforcement, state regulators might engage in de-
sirable “vacuum filling”—stepping in to bring enforcement ac-
tions when federal regulators should, but do not; or, state and 
federal regulators might act cooperatively, efficiently sharing 
the enforcement burden in ways that play to each enforcer’s 
comparative advantage. Consistent with negative accounts of 
concurrent enforcement, state regulators might alternatively 
use their enforcement authority to engage in “rent seeking”—
bringing actions that advance their state’s parochial interests 
at the expense of the nation at large. State regulators might al-
so use their concurrent enforcement authority to promote their 
personal political ambitions, with more ambiguous effects on 
social welfare. These divergent claims about state enforcement 
behavior are often asserted, but rarely tested. Empirical re-
search is necessary to determine which state motivations dom-
inate in a particular regulatory context. 
This Article’s second contribution—a case study of concur-
rent state-federal enforcement of securities fraud laws against 
nationally traded firms—helps to illustrate these points. Part 
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III analyzes concurrent enforcement’s potential in the securi-
ties fraud context with an eye to the contextual factors de-
scribed above. It explains that state efforts to deter fraud in the 
national capital markets can create both positive and negative 
interstate externalities, and posits that federal laws to promote 
optimal securities fraud deterrence are justified for this reason. 
It further explains how the structural factors identified in Part 
II.B counsel that concurrent state enforcement in this context 
is likely to be costly: fraud prohibitions tend to be broadly writ-
ten and prone to legal error; state regulators do not enforce fed-
eral fraud prohibitions, but enforce their own state fraud laws; 
multiple states share jurisdiction; and there are no safeguards 
built into the system that allow for federal oversight of state 
enforcement efforts. This does not decide the case against con-
current state enforcement, however, as many scholars also be-
lieve that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
primary federal securities law enforcer, under-enforces. The 
desirability of concurrent enforcement thus turns heavily on 
how state regulators actually use their enforcement authority. 
Those who favor maintaining a concurrent state role assume 
that state enforcers do more good than harm, by filling federal 
enforcement gaps or working cooperatively with the SEC; those 
who favor preemption assume state enforcers do more harm 
than good, by bringing actions that benefit the state enforcer at 
the expense of the national capital markets. Unfortunately, 
these assumptions have been based more on intuition than da-
ta. What is known about state enforcement has come almost 
exclusively from anecdotal accounts of activity by New York’s 
Attorney General, without a good sense of what securities regu-
lators in the other forty-nine states have been doing. 
To help clarify this empirical uncertainty over the desira-
bility of concurrent state-federal securities fraud enforcement, 
this Article uses a large, unique dataset—which contains in-
formation gathered from the litigation disclosures in over 5000 
annual reports filed with the SEC by nearly 2000 public com-
panies—to test the various hypotheses about state enforcement 
behavior described earlier. I label these the “Vacuum Filling,” 
“Cooperation,” “Rent Seeking,” and “Political Entrepreneur” 
hypotheses. As discussed in Part IV, the results of quantitative 
and qualitative testing of these hypotheses suggest each has 
some explanatory power, leading to the conclusion that state 
enforcement in the securities area has had mixed social welfare 
effects. For example, while some states (like New York) have 
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arguably used their enforcement authority to fill federal en-
forcement vacuums, others (like West Virginia) have seemingly 
used it to engage in rent seeking. These findings leave the de-
sirability of concurrent state enforcement uncertain, but they 
do have prescriptive implications: they invite incremental re-
forms designed to preserve concurrent state enforcement’s posi-
tive potential, while mitigating its ability to do harm to our na-
tional capital markets. Part IV.C identifies several potential 
reforms in this vein. 
The case study offered here is important because it ad-
vances the long-standing debate over the optimal design of the 
U.S. securities fraud deterrence regime.14
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
provides a brief overview of the costs and benefits traditionally 
associated with concurrent state-federal enforcement regimes. 
Part II identifies a variety of contextual factors that will affect 
the magnitude of these costs and benefits, and which must be 
considered before any judgment can be made about concurrent 
 It also illustrates the 
type of reasoned contextual analysis that can and should be 
applied in the numerous other regulatory areas that utilize 
concurrent state-federal enforcement. Of course, in another 
regulatory area federal intervention may have a distinct pur-
pose that leads to a different conclusion about state enforce-
ment’s potential costs and benefits, or the structural features of 
the concurrent enforcement regime may be such that state en-
forcement is not as worrisome, or it may be that the relevant 
federal or state regulators have a different track record that 
leads to different conclusions about the optimal allocation of en-
forcement authority. The point to take away is that although 
contexts differ, a sophisticated analysis of a concurrent state-
federal enforcement regime requires more than an ad hoc—and 
potentially biased—weighing of costs and benefits. Attention to 
the context-specific factors identified in this Article is critical to 
distinguishing, on a principled basis, the settings where con-
current state enforcement is likely to be beneficial and those 
where it is likely to be detrimental, or at least of questionable 
value. Cases studies attentive to these factors might also help 
identify creative reforms that could improve the functioning of 
a concurrent enforcement regime notwithstanding empirical 
uncertainty regarding federal and state enforcement behavior, 
as this Article’s case study does in the securities fraud context. 
 
 14. See infra note 123. 
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enforcement’s desirability in a particular regulatory setting. 
Applying this learning, Part III provides a case study of concur-
rent enforcement of securities fraud laws against nationally 
traded firms. That case study is continued in Part IV, which 
reports empirical findings on enforcement behavior by state se-
curities regulators and discusses the implications of these find-
ings for reform. The Article then briefly concludes. 
I.  CONCURRENT ENFORCEMENT: COSTS AND BENEFITS   
Concurrent state-federal enforcement regimes are com-
monplace in the United States today. State regulators15 are 
sometimes authorized to enforce federal laws.16 They also fre-
quently retain authority to enforce state laws in situations 
where federal laws exist that target the same misconduct.17 
Proponents of competitive federalism are quick to point out the 
costs of concurrent state-federal enforcement authority,18 
whereas proponents of cooperative federalism tend to trumpet 
its benefits.19 This Part provides a brief but balanced catalogue 
of both the costs and benefits that scholars have associated 
with concurrent state-federal enforcement regimes. The next 
Part demonstrates the highly contextual nature of the cost-
benefit calculation.20
 
 15. Throughout I use this term broadly to encompass all varieties of state 
enforcers, including state attorneys general, as well as appointed agency 
heads.  
 
 16. This is most common in the antitrust and consumer protection areas. 
See Widman & Cox, supra note 2, at 55–57 (discussing twenty-four federal 
laws that explicitly grant enforcement power to the state). 
 17. This will be the case in numerous areas where Congress has legislated 
without expressly or impliedly preempting analogous state laws. 
 18. See generally Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 
MISS. L.J. 557 (2000). 
 19. See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 867–70 (noting costs but focusing on 
unappreciated benefits of jurisdictional redundancy); Bulman-Pozen & 
Gerken, supra note 1, at 1260 (“[W]e focus on the affirmative case for the role 
that uncooperative federalism can play in a well-functioning federal system.”). 
In their books, Professors Chemerinsky and Schapiro both take a normative 
position in favor of overlapping authority. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1; 
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 1; see also WILLIAM W. 
BUZBEE, PREEMPTION CHOICE 3 (2009) (stating that “virtually all chapters in 
this book contribute to the development of normative arguments” in favor of 
jurisdictional overlap). 
 20. Two words about the scope of this Article are in order. First, the Arti-
cle focuses on enforcement. When it comes to the promulgation of legal rules, 
as well as their implementation through regulatory programs, the relationship 
between the states and the federal government can be even more complex. For 
interesting discussions of the legal issues that can arise from this brand of co-
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A. COSTS 
The costs typically associated with concurrent enforcement 
regimes include added expense, the potential for policy distor-
tion, and a loss of democratic accountability.  
1. Expense 
When state and federal enforcers monitor for the same 
misconduct, the total outlay of government resources is likely 
to be higher than if a single enforcer did the job alone. The 
same is true when state and federal enforcers pursue the same 
instance of misconduct, at least in an uncoordinated way. From 
the perspective of regulated parties, the expense of defending 
against multiple investigations or lawsuits is likely to be higher 
than defending against a single investigation or lawsuit, in 
terms of both out-of-pocket legal costs and time and distrac-
tion21; moreover, settlement discussions are more complicated.22 
Facing concurrent state and federal enforcement also imposes 
ex ante costs on regulated parties, as they must monitor the en-
forcement decisions of more actors in order to ensure their 
compliance with the law (as interpreted by the various enforc-
ers) and adjust their behavior accordingly.23
 
operative federalism, see Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statu-
tory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform 
and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011), and Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and 
Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Fed-
erally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1343 (2005). Second, this Article focuses on how best to allocate enforcement 
authority as a matter of policy. It ignores—and takes no position regarding—
the constitutional dimension of the federalism question. Cf. Edward L. Rubin 
& Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
 If regulated parties 
operate or sell goods in multiple states, they may face a “bal-
41 UCLA 
L. REV. 903, 909 (1994) (arguing that the “Supreme Court should never invoke 
federalism as a reason for invalidating a federal statute or as a principle for 
interpreting it”). 
 21. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 1, at 291 
(observing that if “federal and state regulations both apply, federal and state 
authorities may each seek to enforce the laws in separate, uncoordinated pro-
ceedings,” increasing costs and undermining finality).  
 22. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001) (observing that concurrent enforcement in the anti-
trust context serves “to lengthen the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, 
magnify and protract the uncertainty engendered by the litigation, and in-
crease litigation costs”). 
 23. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 1, at 290 
(“Keeping track of multiple obligations may tax individuals and firms, espe-
cially those operating in more than one state.”).  
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kanized” landscape of regulatory obligations, increasing the 
cost of doing business. 
2. Policy Distortion 
Another cost of concurrent enforcement is its potential to 
detract from coherent policy. How the law is enforced can influ-
ence behavior as much as, and sometimes even more than, how 
the law is written. The particular misconduct that enforcers 
choose to target, their investigative methods, the type and level 
of sanctions that they seek to have imposed (whether judicially 
or through settlement), and the frequency at which they choose 
to prosecute can powerfully affect the behavior of regulated 
parties. A monopolistic enforcer can control, and adjust, its en-
forcement choices in order to achieve desired policy outcomes.24 
Introducing multiple enforcers makes these policy levers more 
difficult to utilize effectively.25 Policy distortion can result from 
mere lack of coordination and communication between enforc-
ers. But it can also result when different enforcers have differ-
ent views on what the appropriate policy should be.26 When this 
occurs, the more aggressive enforcer’s viewpoint will always 
win out, creating a one-way ratchet as regulated parties adjust 
their behavior to conform to the demands of the strictest en-
forcer with jurisdiction over them.27
That concurrent state-federal enforcement regimes may 
lead to this sort of policy distortion is not far-fetched. Federal 
and state enforcers are likely to have differing policy perspec-
tives for a variety of reasons. For example, federal enforcers 
should be concerned with maximizing national welfare, where-
as state enforcers should be concerned with maximizing the 
welfare of their particular state. This may lead states to pursue 
actions that are in their parochial interest, but which are not in 
 
 
 24. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities 
Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2194–97 (2010) 
(discussing use of prosecutorial discretion in the securities fraud context). 
 25. See id. at 2204–05 (explaining how concurrent enforcement compli-
cates effective use of prosecutorial discretion); see also Lemos, supra note 2, at 
703 (“[S]tate-level variation in enforcement (as in regulation) can produce inef-
ficient and undesirable policy outcomes.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 2, at 749 (highlighting conflict between 
state and federal enforcement agencies over marijuana possession).  
 27. See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 889–90 (acknowledging that 
“intersystemic regulation may serve as the handmaiden of over-regulation” by 
creating a “one-way competitive ratchet”); Lemos, supra note 2, at 749 (“[T]he 
ratchet only moves in one direction: toward more enforcement.”). This assumes 
that regulated parties cannot easily escape the jurisdiction. 
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the best interest of the nation as a whole. Moreover, federal en-
forcers are often embedded in administrative agencies, which 
are staffed by experts and designed to promote nonpartisan 
decisionmaking.28 State enforcers, by contrast, are often elected 
generalists, making them potentially more sensitive to populist 
demands and less sensitive to the more diffuse costs of exces-
sive regulation.29
3. Loss of Accountability 
 Finally, the party affiliation of state enforcers 
may differ from the party affiliation of the President or the ma-
jority in Congress, both of whom stand in a position to influence 
the enforcement policies of federal administrative agencies. 
The potential for policy distortion is tied to another fre-
quently cited cost of concurrent enforcement: a loss of demo-
cratic accountability.30 When multiple enforcers are responsible 
for shaping policy, it becomes more difficult for the electorate to 
monitor them and to accurately assign blame or praise for poli-
cy outcomes.31 This may negatively affect enforcement behavior 
by eroding discipline; it also creates incentives for enforcers to 
free-ride on the efforts of others, which may lead to less vigor-
ous enforcement overall.32
Even more troublesome, if enforcers from a particular state 
shape policies with a nationwide impact, non-state residents 
  
 
 28. See id. at 701 (describing the typical agents of federal enforcement as 
“appointed[] specialist[s]”).  
 29. See id. at 700–01 (explaining that state enforcers have different incen-
tives than federal enforcers, both because they seek to vindicate state rather 
than national interests and because state officials tend to be political actors, 
unlike federal bureaucrats); see, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Federalism and Ac-
countability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Fed-
eralism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 890 (2007) (discussing how political ambigui-
ties can affect the enforcement incentives of state attorneys general). 
 30. See Greve, supra note 18, at 584 (“Even defenders of cooperative ar-
rangements agree that cooperative federalism diffuses political accountability 
and responsibility.”). 
 31. See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 897 (explaining that regulatory overlap 
may diminish the quality of oversight because there are more regulators to 
monitor). A similar concern has been voiced in the Supreme Court’s Commerce 
Clause and anti-commandeering jurisprudence. See Schapiro, Interactive Fed-
eralism, supra note 1, at 291–92. 
 32. See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 897–98 (observing that regulatory over-
lap may cause regulators to free ride “on the expected contributions of one’s 
counterpart agency” and allows them to shift the blame to others in the event 
of regulatory failure—creating a “regulatory commons”); Barkow, supra note 2, 
at 56 (“When only one agency has responsibility for enforcement, it is more 
likely to be diligent in pursuing that task because it knows it will be accounta-
ble for any failures.”). 
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must live with the consequences despite their inability to exert 
influence on the state enforcer through the ballot box.33 To be 
sure, these citizens have a voice through their representatives 
in Congress, and Congress can almost always strip states of 
their enforcement authority.34 But preemption is a blunt in-
strument and one that is extremely difficult to convince Con-
gress to pick up.35
Finally, use of concurrent state-federal enforcement may 
undermine broader separation of powers values at both the fed-
eral and the state level. At the federal level, Congress may fa-
vor state enforcement as a way to weaken executive influence.
  
36
 
 33. See Lemos, supra note 
 
At the state level, legislative checks are weakened when state 
enforcers are authorized to enforce federal laws that state legis-
latures have not, and would not, pass. Of course, the President 
could veto legislation that created or preserved a role for con-
current state enforcement, just as state legislatures could pass 
laws stripping state enforcers of authority to enforce federal 
2, at 741 (“[S]tates’ enforcement efforts may 
have nationwide consequences because of their impact on the regulated com-
munity, even if the law on the books remains the same. One state’s aggressive 
enforcement can prompt potential defendants to change their practices across 
the board.”); Meyer, supra note 29, at 910 (“Because an industry will often find 
it cheaper to change its national operations rather than its operations in only 
a group of states, lawsuits seeking to change the way in which businesses op-
erate can have national effects without national input.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era 
of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 637 (2004) (observing that “voters 
throughout the country [have] an opportunity to persuade Congress to 
preempt those state law provisions that lack popular support”); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Federalism in Corporate/Securities Laws: Reflections on Dela-
ware, California, and State Regulation of Insider Trading, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 
879, 892 (2006) (suggesting the preemption threat mitigates state overreach-
ing in the securities context).  
 35. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Coopera-
tion and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 114–16 (2004) (high-
lighting an example in which even strong lobbying by business groups and 
prominent federal government officials was not enough to get Congress to 
preempt state enforcement).  
 36. See Gluck, supra note 20, at 573 (observing concurrent state enforce-
ment “might assuage concerns of [federal] legislators who are suspicious of, or 
politically opposed to, the current executive branch’s policy agenda” and not-
ing that “[w]ork in the political science realm has, indeed, documented an in-
crease in such delegations toward the states and away from the federal gov-
ernment in times of divided government”). Of course, if one believes that 
executive influence is outsized today, and thus itself an affront to separation of 
powers values, state enforcement might be viewed as a valuable corrective. See 
generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation 
of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012). 
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laws, but, as with preemption, these are blunt and costly—and 
therefore imperfect—remedies.37
B. BENEFITS 
 
A variety of benefits have also been recognized to flow from 
concurrent state-federal enforcement, including most notably 
the ability of state enforcers to remedy federal under-
enforcement. Some have also argued that state enforcers pos-
sess certain advantages over federal regulators, such as greater 
knowledge and expertise about local conditions, which can fos-
ter regulatory tailoring and innovation. Relatedly, state en-
forcement may increase opportunities for citizen influence. 
1. Remedying Federal Under-Enforcement 
By far the benefit of concurrent state-federal enforcement 
most stressed in the literature is the ability of state enforcers to 
make up for lax enforcement by federal agencies.38 Federal 
agencies may under-enforce due to resource constraints, which 
state enforcement budgets and existing infrastructure can help 
alleviate.39 More troubling, under-enforcement may also result 
from poor regulatory incentives. Federal enforcement agents 
may take an excessively light touch because they are captured 
by regulated parties, because they hope to increase their 
chances of exiting the agency through a “revolving door,” or 
simply because it is easier than working hard.40
 
 37. To be sure, if the state enforcer is an elected officer, and the federal 
enforcer is an appointed bureaucrat, concurrent state enforcement may also 
increase accountability. This possibility is discussed infra at Part I.B.3. If 
elected state enforcers in turn delegate enforcement to the private bar, howev-
er, new accountability concerns are introduced. See infra Part IV.B.1.d. (dis-
cussing the practice of West Virginia’s Attorney General to hire private law-
yers to litigate matters on behalf of the state). 
 State enforcers 
can help to fill enforcement gaps that result and can discipline 
federal agencies going forward by threatening to expose en-
 38. See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 885–88 (explaining how overlapping 
state-federal jurisdiction can help overcome regulatory inertia by creating a 
“fail-safe” system of redundancy that protects against under-regulation); 
Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 1, at 290 (same). 
 39. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 58 (“State AGs can . . . serve a valuable 
equalizing function by bringing enforcement actions when a federal agency 
shares the state’s outlook on regulation but lacks the resources to police all 
infractions.”); Lemos, supra note 2, at 721 (observing that “[s]tates may have 
an investigatory or enforcement apparatus in place—a local police force, for 
example—that would be costly for the federal government to replicate”). 
 40. See Rose, supra note 24, at 2212–19 (discussing the assumptions un-
derlying claims that federal enforcers will systematically under-deter). 
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forcement failures.41 Indeed, state enforcement has been lik-
ened to other administrative law tools designed to improve the 
performance of independent federal agencies—such as removal 
protection for agency heads, multimember structures, and ex-
emptions from cost-benefit review of proposed rules by the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs.42
State enforcers may be inclined to play this “agency watch-
dog” role because, as discussed earlier, they face different in-
centives than federal enforcers. These differing incentives may 
be detrimental if they operate to distort welfare-enhancing fed-
eral policies, but they can also be beneficial if they cure wel-
fare-destroying federal policies. Because they are accountable 
to a different set of constituencies, it may prove harder for reg-
ulated parties to capture state enforcers than a federal enforc-
er.
 
43 Capture will also be harder—or at least more expensive—
simply because in a concurrent enforcement regime there are 
more enforcers that must be captured to ensure the desired 
level of under-enforcement. The revolving door may also be less 
available to state enforcers, removing that temptation to devi-
ate from optimal regulatory policy.44 Finally, when multiple en-
forcers are tasked with regulating the same misconduct, com-
petitive instincts may kick in—particularly for enforcers with 
political ambitions—overcoming incentives to take the easier 
path.45
2. Local Advantages 
  
It is often observed that state enforcers may better under-
stand local conditions or have better access to relevant evi-
dence, giving them an advantage over federal enforcers located 
 
 41. See Lemos, supra note 2, at 748–49 (“[T]he potential for . . . gap-filling 
by individual states should reduce the likelihood of nonenforcement at the 
outset.”).  
 42. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 15; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Federal-
ism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70 (2011) (articulating 
“the belief that states are likely to be particularly effective monitors of [feder-
al] agencies and instigators of administrative change”). 
 43. See, e.g., id. at 56–57 (noting that state AGs “often win elections by 
appealing to broad consumer interests.”).  
 44. See REVOLVING DOOR WORKING GRP., A MATTER OF TRUST: HOW THE 
REVOLVING DOOR UNDERMINES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT—AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 85 (2005) (explaining that more than half the states 
have revolving door restrictions for senior-level government employees).  
 45. See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 1, at 287 (highlight-
ing the importance of “state-federal competition for the affections of the peo-
ple”).  
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in Washington or regional field offices.46 They may also be more 
available to the local citizenry, facilitating a greater flow of in-
formation and, as a result, higher detection rates.47 State en-
forcers may use this knowledge and access to tailor their en-
forcement efforts to local needs. The multiplicity of enforcement 
approaches that states adopt may, in turn, facilitate cross-
jurisdictional learning, leading to an improvement of the en-
forcement regime overall.48
3. Citizen Participation 
 
As discussed above, concurrent state-federal enforcement 
is often associated with a loss of democratic accountability. But 
it can also pay democratic dividends by increasing the oppor-
tunity for citizen influence. It has been observed that “[s]tate 
enforcers may be more accessible and responsive [to citizens] 
than federal agencies, both because states are smaller units of 
government and because state attorneys general tend to be 
elected rather than appointed.”49
 
 46. See Lemos, supra note 
 In addition, concurrent state-
federal authority can create “an incentive for state and federal 
officials to disseminate information about who is to blame for a 
problem,” thus ensuring that “the people with the most infor-
mation about who is responsible—and the greatest ability to 
2, at 721 (explaining that state enforcers “are 
likely to have a better understanding of local conditions than their federal 
counterparts, simply by virtue of living and working in the state.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 752 (“[D]ivergent enforcement practices by various states 
and a federal agency generate useful information not only about possible poli-
cy approaches, but also about possible ways to structure public enforcement.”); 
Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers 
and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and 
Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1351 (2005) (“States are . . . more 
likely to experiment in a regulatory approach, trying out mechanisms that 
would not likely be adopted without experience by Congress or federal regula-
tors. State enforcement . . . encourage[s] experimentation with different ap-
proaches and allow[s] federal goals to be tailored to local conditions.”). 
 49. Id. at 746; see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1291 
(explaining that state involvement may bolster accountability “by offering 
more access points for individuals who oppose federal policy” given that “they 
can petition not only the federal government, but also state officials”); Robert 
A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 
1699–1704 (2007) (surveying evidence that citizens trust their state govern-
ments more than the federal government); Rossi, supra note 48, at 1350–51 
(“[G]iven the reduced cost of political mobilization at the state and local levels, 
involving states in the regulatory process may increase participation, which 
can have obvious payoffs for regulatory compliance, legitimacy, and efficien-
cy.”).  
  
2013] STATE ENFORCEMENT 1359 
 
get that information out—will be hard at work educating vot-
ers.”50
 
 
***** 
 
As this brief overview makes clear, the desirability of con-
current state-federal enforcement is highly indeterminate when 
discussed in the abstract. The best that can be said at a trans-
substantive level is that such regimes can create both signifi-
cant costs and significant benefits. To get traction on the net 
effect of concurrent enforcement requires a nuanced appraisal 
of how it operates within a particular regulatory setting. The 
next Part seeks to advance our understanding of concurrent 
state-federal enforcement by identifying several contextual fac-
tors that will influence the magnitude of the costs and benefits 
it potentially produces. 
II.  THE CONTINGENT CASE FOR CONCURRENT 
ENFORCEMENT   
The recent spate of literature on concurrent state-federal 
enforcement regimes takes as a starting point that the miscon-
duct targeted is a proper topic of federal interest and views the 
states’ role as fundamentally subordinate to—indeed, in service 
of—federal regulatory goals. Rachel Barkow, for example, con-
ceptualizes state enforcement as a tool Congress can use to dis-
cipline federal administrative agencies.51 Gillian Metzger’s 
work also treats the “preservation of state authority less as a 
goal worth pursuing in its own right than instrumentally as an 
important mechanism for guarding against federal agency fail-
ure.”52 Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken go so far as 
to liken the federal government to “master” and the states to 
“servants.”53
To the extent that there are areas of regulation that do not 
belong in the hands of the federal government—whether as a 
matter of constitutional mandate or good public policy—the 
case for concurrent enforcement is obviously mooted. In other 
 
 
 50. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1291. 
 51. See generally Barkow, supra note 2. 
 52. Metzger, supra note 42, at 5. 
 53. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1270; see also Gluck, supra 
note 20, at 565 (describing state enforcement of federal law as a potential tool 
“of national power, a specific strategy used by the federal government to 
strengthen its new federal laws and the federal norms they introduce”). 
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words, the potential desirability of concurrent enforcement de-
pends on one’s answer to first order federalism questions about 
the propriety of federal involvement in a particular substantive 
area. Take, for example, corporate law. Those who believe that 
state competition for corporate charters leads to a “race to the 
bottom” and thus favor the federalization of corporate law 
might be persuaded of concurrent enforcement’s virtues: allow-
ing states to enforce federal corporate laws or more sharehold-
er-protective state corporate laws might be viewed as a valua-
ble failsafe in the event of federal under-enforcement.54 But 
those who believe that competition for corporate charters leads 
to a “race-to-the-top” will remain opposed to any form of federal 
intervention in corporate law.55
Even if the propriety of federal involvement is conceded, 
however, a variety of other factors will affect the costs and ben-
efits—and hence ultimately desirability—of concurrent en-
forcement. These other factors are discussed in general terms 
below. The next Part will apply this learning to analyze the 
specific case of securities fraud enforcement against nationally 
traded firms. 
 
A. THE RATIONALE FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
As just noted, whether concurrent state-federal enforce-
ment is desirable becomes a relevant question only if it has 
first been decided that there should be a federal enforcement 
role. Why it has been decided that there should be a federal en-
forcement role, however, bears significantly on this second or-
der question. 
One well-accepted justification for federal intervention in a 
particular regulatory area sounds in efficiency.56
 
 54. See Jones, supra note 34, at 630–31.  
 If states cap-
ture the bulk of both the costs and benefits of regulating a par-
ticular activity, then faithful state representatives are likely to 
adopt policies that maximize social welfare. But if states’ ef-
forts create either positive or negative interstate externalities, 
a case can be made for federal involvement. Consider the en-
forcement context. States might underenforce when in-state de-
 55. See infra note 67 (discussing the race-to-the-top argument in corporate 
law scholarship). 
 56. My purpose in this section is to discuss some of the most common ar-
guments in favor of federal regulation, and how they relate to the case for con-
current state enforcement. The rationales explored are not meant to constitute 
an exhaustive list. 
  
2013] STATE ENFORCEMENT 1361 
 
fendants have engaged in misconduct that harms out-of-state 
interests, or more generally when enforcement efforts would 
create deterrence benefits that would be shared with the entire 
nation. Conversely, states might overenforce when out-of-state 
defendants have engaged in activities detrimental to in-state 
interests.57 Pursuing marginal cases, using draconian investi-
gative procedures, or pushing for excessive sanctions can reap 
in-state benefits, while the overdeterrence costs such activities 
produce are borne by the nation at large. A faithful federal gov-
ernment will have better enforcement incentives in cases in-
volving significant interstate externalities, because unlike the 
states, it will capture both the costs and benefits of its enforce-
ment decisions. Unlike fragmented state actors, it will also 
stand in a unique position to craft a coherent enforcement poli-
cy concerning matters with an interstate dimension.58
Interstate externalities are not the only efficiency-based 
justification for federal intervention. A distinct, and more con-
tested, justification is to prevent a “race to the bottom.”
  
59
 
 57. To underenforce and overenforce in this context should not be under-
stood to refer narrowly to the quantity of cases brought. Instead, the focus is 
case quality—states may under-enforce by bringing too few “good” cases and at 
the same time over-enforce by bringing “bad” ones. Cf. James J. Park, Rules, 
Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. 
REV. 115, 128–29 (2012) (criticizing economic theories of enforcement for fo-
cusing on quantitative rather than qualitative measures of enforcement out-
put). 
 A race 
to the bottom is said to develop when state competition to at-
tract mobile industries, and the jobs and tax revenue they gen-
erate, causes states to adopt laxer regulations (or enforcement 
policies) than they would in the absence of competition, leading 
 58. For the seminal work articulating this rational for federal regulation, 
see generally OATES, supra note 9. For a more recent discussion, see Robert D. 
Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Ar-
ticle I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 135–44 (2010). See also Samuel 
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1387 (2005–06) (“[S]tate officials could well respond to the political 
preferences of the voters of any particular state yielding ‘intrajurisdictional 
efficiency’ at the expense of the ‘interjurisdictional efficiency’ concerns of the 
polity writ large. The end result could be underregulation or overregulation.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 59. This rationale for federal intervention is sometimes alternatively de-
scribed as preventing a tragedy of the commons, see, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, 
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implemen-
tation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–12 (1977), 
or as solving a prisoner’s dilemma, see, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Fed-
eral Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1217–18 (1992). 
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to net social welfare losses.60 This can occur even if states fully 
internalize the costs and benefits of their regulatory choices.61 
In race-to-the-bottom scenarios, federal “floor” regulation is 
viewed as a way to halt the downward spiral.62 As noted, this is 
a contested justification for federal intervention; some scholars 
dispute the claim that state competition leads to inefficient out-
comes, or that federal floor regulation will necessarily increase 
social welfare.63
Race-to-the-bottom concerns have animated many federal 
environmental laws, such as provisions in the Clean Air Act.
 
64 
Some federal environmental laws more directly address prob-
lems of interstate externalities,65 as do many federal laws fo-
cused on the national marketplace.66 Although the corporate 
law debate is typically discussed in race-to-the-bottom terms, it 
is really about interstate externalities, specifically, whether 
states fully consider the impact of their choices on out-of-state 
shareholders in crafting their corporate laws.67
 
 60. For a fuller exposition of the race-to-the-bottom phenomenon, and the 
assumptions underlying the phenomenon, see Revesz, supra note 59, at 1213–
21. 
 
 61. See id. at 1222–23 (distinguishing the race-to-the-bottom rationale for 
federal intervention from the interstate externality rationale). 
 62. See generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, 
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1586–
87 (2007) (defending federal floor preemption as a way to deal with the race-
to-the-bottom phenomenon).  
 63. See generally Revesz, supra note 59, at 1244–47 (arguing that even if 
there were a race to the bottom in the environmental arena, federal environ-
mental regulation could have undesirable effects); see also Kirsten H. Engel, 
State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bot-
tom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 297–315 (1996–97) (exploring the debate over 
whether interstate competition reduces or enhances social welfare). 
 64. See Revesz, supra note 59, at 1224–26 (arguing that the bulk of the 
Clean Air Act was justified by the race-to-the-bottom rationale). 
 65. See, e.g., id. (noting that there were some aspects of the Clean Air 
Act—such as the provision limiting the amount of pollution from upwind 
states permitted to affect air quality in downwind states—directed at inter-
state externalities). 
 66. See, e.g., infra Part III (positing that federal securities regulation is a 
response to concerns about interstate externalities). 
 67. See Revesz, supra note 59, at 1247 (noting that “[t]he legal literature 
has included under the race-to-the-bottom rubric a variety of problems that 
are analytically distinct . . . [such as] the problem of state chartering of corpo-
rations”). The dominant scholarly argument in favor of the federalization of 
corporate law is premised on the belief that managers in diffusely held public 
corporations can get away with making incorporation decisions that favor 
management at the expense of the shareholders. States respond to this reality, 
the argument goes, by crafting their corporate codes to cater to management, 
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Other justifications for federal intervention exist that are 
not grounded in notions of efficiency. For example, even in the 
absence of interstate externalities or race-to-the-bottom con-
cerns, federal intervention may be warranted to protect federal-
ly recognized rights that are viewed as critical to national iden-
tity. Federal laws prohibiting discrimination might be justified 
in this way,68 as might federal laws protecting religious freedom 
and freedom of speech, among other American values.69
When the reason for a particular federal law is to prevent a 
race to the bottom, or to protect a base level of national rights, 
and interstate externalities are not a serious concern, the case 
for preserving a state’s enforcement role is apparent. In such a 
scenario, if states were more aggressive in their enforcement of 
federal law than the federal government itself, or chose to pro-
vide greater protection to their citizens under state law, it 
would not result in a “policy distortion,” in the proper sense of 
the term. Rather, it would reflect legitimate state policies that 
truly come, in the famous words of Justice Brandeis, “without 
risk to the rest of the country.”
 
70
 
as doing so earns them franchise tax revenue and other benefits while the 
costs are mostly borne by out-of-state shareholders. This is problematic from a 
social welfare perspective, because as residual claimants, shareholders are 
thought to have the best incentives to maximize firm value. Those who oppose 
the federalization of corporate law, by contrast, believe that market forces 
keep managers faithful to shareholders, and thus that states have incentives 
to adopt corporate laws that cater to shareholders and, as a result, efficiently 
maximize the size of the corporate pie. For the classic arguments on each side 
of this debate, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251, 290 (1977). 
 The costs and benefits of those 
policies would be felt primarily within the respective states, 
and federal policy goals would be respected. Moreover, account-
ability concerns would be less pressing; it should be fairly easy 
for citizens to understand that the federal government has set a 
floor, and deviations above that floor are each state’s responsi-
bility. Of course, even in this context concurrent enforcement is 
not costless. It could result in duplicative enforcement efforts 
and added expense, among other things. But the cost side of the 
 68. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 53–54 (1995) 
(arguing a strong national authority was necessary to protect the rights of mi-
norities from institutionalized racism at the state level following the Civil 
War). 
 69. Some view environmental regulation in this way. See, e.g., Engel, su-
pra note 63, at 288–92 (discussing the “environmental rights” argument). 
 70. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
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ledger is fairly light, and the case for allowing states to provide 
tailored protections to their own citizens is compelling.  
When federal intervention is warranted as a way to deal 
with interstate externalities, by contrast, the wisdom of concur-
rent state enforcement is more difficult to establish. If the risk 
of over-enforcement at the state level is the reason for federal 
intervention, then maintaining concurrent state enforcement—
as opposed to preempting any state role—would be counterpro-
ductive, at least absent some level of federal control to prevent 
abusive state enforcement and ensure federal policy goals are 
actualized. If the risk justifying federal involvement is state-
level under-enforcement, preserving a state role may be desira-
ble. Federal enforcers may, after all, themselves under-enforce, 
such that supplemental state enforcement—even if predictably 
limited—may help push toward optimal levels, as well as pro-
vide the additional benefits associated with a concurrent state 
role. But this still loosens the federal government’s control over 
policy outcomes, and introduces added expense and a potential 
loss of democratic accountability. If, more realistically, there is 
a risk of both under- and over-enforcement at the state level 
(i.e., too few “good” cases and too many “bad” ones),71
The remainder of this Part assumes a scenario where the 
purpose of the federal intervention is to deal with interstate ex-
ternalities. As explained above, this is the context that raises 
by far the most serious questions about the desirability of con-
current state enforcement. Moreover, cooperative and competi-
tive federalists alike recognize the presence of interstate exter-
nalities to be a valid reason for federal regulation,
 the calcu-
lus becomes most complex. Will the reduction in under-
enforcement costs concurrent state enforcement promises out-
weigh the over-enforcement and other costs it risks producing? 
This is the most challenging question policymakers must face, 
and it is fundamentally empirical in nature.  
72 although in 
particular regulatory contexts there may be empirical disa-
greement over whether significant interstate externalities ac-
tually exist.73
 
 71. See supra note 57. 
 This assumption thus allows us to avoid conten-
tious first order federalism questions that too often muddy 
discussions of optimal enforcement design. 
 72. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 119 (“National action often 
may be desirable to prevent spillovers and externalities.”). 
 73. The corporate law context is one where such disagreement exists. See 
supra note 67. 
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B. STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE CONCURRENT ENFORCEMENT 
REGIME 
Several structural features of a concurrent enforcement re-
gime will also influence the magnitude of the costs and benefits 
it produces. Unlike the rationale for federal involvement, which 
may be subject to dispute, these features are easily observable. 
1. The Substantive Prohibition 
The importance of enforcement discretion to policy out-
comes is contextually dependent. It is most critical when the 
law is vague or overbroad, leaving regulated parties looking to 
prosecutors and courts for clues on how to comply.74 If the law 
identifies the behavior to be proscribed with specificity, and the 
risk of legal error and misguided prosecution is low (which is 
likely to be the case with a very specific law), unleashing mul-
tiple enforcers is less worrisome. Regulated parties can avoid 
sanction with confidence, and the possibility of policy distortion 
through enforcement discretion is low.75 In other words, be-
cause the risk of over deterrence is low, state enforcement is 
unlikely to produce significant negative interstate externali-
ties.76 Thus, whether the misconduct is proscribed in terms of 
clear rules or vague standards is important in determining the 
potential costs of a concurrent state-federal enforcement re-
gime.77
 
 74. See Lemos, supra note 
  
2, at 759 (“Concerns about disuniformity recede 
when states are called upon to enforce a relatively precise federal statute or 
regulation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 75. There are, of course, a variety of other factors that influence the choice 
between rules and standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).  
 76. This is not to say that the risk of policy distortion and over deterrence 
would be nonexistent. If firms are held vicariously liable for their employees’ 
actions, they might not be able to avoid liability with confidence despite the 
law’s specificity, and concurrent enforcement might undesirably ratchet up 
expected sanctions. This may lead firms to over-invest in internal deterrence 
measures. See Rose, supra note 24, at 2187. 
 77. Professor Bulman-Pozen similarly observes that “the broader the del-
egation [of authority to a federal agency], or the more ambiguous the statute, 
the more room there may be for states to contest federal executive power.” 
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 36, at 487. But she views this as a benefit, based on 
two key assumptions: (1) the federal executive is likely to deviate from con-
gressional wishes when given such an open-ended grant of authority, and (2) 
state enforcement efforts will operate to check this tendency in desirable ways. 
I discuss federal and state enforcement behavior separately below. See infra 
Part II.C–D. 
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2. State Enforcement of Federal vs. State Law 
Concurrent enforcement, as that term is used in this Arti-
cle, comes in two varieties. First, states may be granted author-
ity to enforce federal laws that are also enforced by federal 
agencies. For example, state attorneys general are explicitly 
authorized to enforce a variety of federal antitrust and consum-
er protection laws.78
This second variety of concurrent enforcement is most 
prevalent, as it catches a multitude of areas where Congress 
has chosen to legislate without preempting state law. It also 
presents greater potential costs in terms of federal policy dis-
tortion, because it allows for greater state level deviation from 
federal policy goals (assuming, importantly, that the relevant 
state laws are not restricted to primarily intrastate activities).
 Second, states may enforce state laws that 
target the same type of misconduct as federal laws enforceable 
by federal agencies. For example, states can also enforce their 
own antitrust and consumer protection laws in situations 
where federal enforcers could target the same type of miscon-
duct under federal law.  
79 
Indeed, it would allow for such deviation even in cases where 
the federal rule is fairly well defined. This in turn creates high-
er expense for regulated parties, in the form of monitoring and 
compliance costs, and heightens the democratic accountability 
concerns that flow from states’ ability to affect policy outcomes 
outside their borders. Unlike state enforcement of federal law, 
however, it does not interfere with state level separation of 
powers arrangements. It also means that state enforcement 
will affect only the development of state doctrine, rather than 
influencing the very meaning of federal law.80
The benefits of this variety of concurrent enforcement rela-
tive to state enforcement of federal law are uncertain. States 
have a greater ability to tailor and innovate when state law is 
  
 
 78. See Widman & Cox, supra note 2, at 56–57 (discussing the explicit 
grants of state enforcement authority in federal laws, including the Clayton 
Act, the Nutrition Labeling Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Con-
sumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, and the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act). 
 79. See Lemos, supra note 2, at 760 (“If socially valuable activity will be 
deterred by overly aggressive enforcement, state enforcement of federal law 
seems significantly less threatening than states’ ability to create and enforce 
legal standards that are stricter than the federal model.”).  
 80. Cf. id. at 740 (“State enforcement [of federal law] may change federal 
‘law in the books’ by generating judicial decisions that clarify the scope of the 
law.”). 
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their instrument, but one can question whether substantive tai-
loring and innovation is desirable when federal intervention is 
meant to address interstate externalities. Citizens also have 
more influence over the development of state law, but if such 
influence produces out-of-state effects it comes at a democratic 
cost. Most importantly, when states keep control over the law 
itself, rather than just enforcement, the potential for states to 
check federal agency under-enforcement due to capture may be 
greater. This assumes, however, that the federal enforcement 
agency has control over the content of federal law. For example, 
if captured federal agencies can engage in rulemaking that un-
desirably restricts the scope of federal law, state enforcement of 
state law can serve as a counterweight whereas state enforce-
ment of federal law could not. But the marginal benefits of this 
sort of check are likely less than the marginal benefits of pre-
serving just an enforcement role. This is because the failure to 
bring an enforcement action is not subject to any form of judi-
cial review, heightening capture concerns.81 Rulemaking, by 
contrast, is subject to judicial review, as well as notice and 
comment procedures.82
3. Number of States with Concurrent Jurisdiction  
 
In some regulatory areas concurrent state-federal enforce-
ment authority means that the federal government and a single 
state will share jurisdiction over particular misconduct. The 
number of states with jurisdiction may be singular because the 
conduct is intrastate in nature, which as previously explained 
makes an easy case for concurrent state enforcement (though a 
more contestable case for federal intervention in the first in-
 
 81. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664–75 (2004) (explaining 
how both the doctrines of nonreviewability and standing operate to “prohibit 
parties from challenging, and courts from examining, agency refusals to initi-
ate enforcement proceedings”); see also Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism 
Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforce-
ment Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement 
Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 190 (2010) (observing that state en-
forcement is particularly important given these doctrines). 
 82. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012) (providing 
an overview of judicial review as related to federal rulemaking). States may 
have an easier time establishing standing to challenge federal agency deci-
sions than private parties. Metzger, supra note 42, at 40–41. If the concern 
were congressional capture, then the case for retaining state law would be 
stronger. But the recent literature views concurrent state enforcement as a 
tool Congress uses to check capture at agencies dominated by the executive 
branch. See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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stance).83 But it is also possible when interstate externalities 
justify a federal enforcement role. For example, as explained 
above, some believe that state corporate law generates inter-
state externalities that warrant federal intervention. If a feder-
al corporate code were enacted while preserving more “share-
holder-friendly” state laws, only a single state would have 
concurrent jurisdiction because the internal affairs doctrine al-
lows firms to opt exclusively into the corporate laws of a single 
state. It could also be the case in other areas where the nature 
of the regulated conduct and jurisdictional rules work in prac-
tice to expose regulated parties to the authority of only a single 
state, in addition to the federal government. Various gun and 
drug crimes might be examples. In other situations, however, 
concurrent enforcement authority exposes regulated parties to 
prosecution for the same misconduct by the federal government 
and the governments of more than one—and potentially all fif-
ty—states. Firms engaged in interstate commerce, for example, 
may expose themselves to antitrust liability on such a scale by 
virtue of their national operations.84
This distinction bears on the magnitude of a variety of 
costs and benefits typically associated with concurrent en-
forcement. On the cost side, the expense of a concurrent en-
forcement regime will rise with the number of states with ju-
risdiction. There will be more governments monitoring for the 
same misconduct, and the potential for duplicative, uncoordi-
 
 
 83. See supra Part II.A. 
 84. A mature debate exists over the wisdom of concurrent state enforce-
ment in the antitrust context. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State 
and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673 (2004) (defending con-
current state enforcement); Carole R. Doris, Another View on State Antitrust 
Enforcement—A Reply to Judge Posner, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (2001) (same); 
Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004 (2001) (same); Robert L. Hubbard & James 
Yoon, How the Antitrust Modernization Commission Should View State Anti-
trust Enforcement, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 497 (2005) (same); cf. Richard 
A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attor-
neys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252–66 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 
2004) [hereinafter COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT] (criticizing concurrent 
state enforcement); Michael L. Denger & D. Jarrett Arp, Does Our Multifacet-
ed Enforcement System Promote Sound Competition Policy?, 15 ANTITRUST 41 
(2001) (same); Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 877 (2003); Posner, supra note 22 (same). For 
more information about this debate, see also Michael DeBow, State Antitrust 
Enforcement: Empirical Evidence and a Modest Reform Proposal, in COMPETI-
TION LAWS IN CONFLICT, at 267–88; Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? An-
titrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005). 
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nated investigations and lawsuits will increase, along with reg-
ulated parties’ monitoring and compliance costs. There will also 
be a greater risk of policy distortion. A large number of states 
with jurisdiction suggests a low likelihood each individual state 
will internalize a significant portion of the over-deterrence 
costs produced by bringing opportunistic enforcement actions. 
Moreover, a collective action dynamic might lead states to bring 
those sorts of actions when they otherwise would not, on the ra-
tionale that if they do not another state likely will. The same 
collective action dynamic might weaken the threat of federal 
preemption as a disciplining device, to the extent it operates as 
one.85
That said, the primary benefit of concurrent enforcement—
its ability to counter lax federal enforcement—likely increases 
with the number of enforcers. It is easier for parties interested 
in under-enforcement to capture federal regulators and a single 
state than federal regulators and multiple states. If multiple 
states have jurisdiction, it also increases the aggregate en-
forcement resources available. It should be noted, however, 
that having a multiplicity of enforcers can also cut the other 
way by creating a free-rider problem, as each state might prefer 
another to incur the costs of enforcement. 
 Finally, the difficulty of deciphering just who is responsi-
ble for policy outcomes increases with the number of enforcers, 
heightening democratic accountability concerns.  
4. Safeguards 
When Congress has affirmatively created a concurrent 
state-federal enforcement regime—as opposed to passively cre-
ating one by legislating without preempting analogous state 
laws—it has often included provisions in the legislation that 
help to mitigate the potential for state enforcement efforts to 
create redundant expense or to distort national policy goals. 
For example, advance notice requirements are common; these 
facilitate dialogue and discourage duplication of effort by re-
quiring a state enforcer to notify the relevant federal enforce-
ment agency of its plan to initiate an action.86
 
 85. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 In addition, state 
enforcement is sometimes barred if a related federal action is 
 86. Lemos, supra note 2, at 708. This sort of notice requirement can also 
assist Congress in monitoring the federal enforcement agency, by drawing at-
tention to cases that it has chosen not to pursue. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra 
note 36, at 498 (explaining how state regulators “can make Congress more 
likely to pay attention, to have the information it needs, and to be motivated to 
correct the administration of federal law”). 
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pending, and federal agencies are sometimes given a right to 
intervene in state enforcement actions, thus allowing them to 
assert more direct influence over the proceedings.87 Federal leg-
islation sometimes requires suits to be brought exclusively in 
federal court, promoting consistency in the interpretation of 
concurrently enforced legal rules.88 Federal legislation also 
sometimes limits the type of remedies that state enforcers can 
pursue, cabining their ability to influence the behavior of regu-
lated parties through the threat of sanctions.89 Finally, federal 
legislation sometimes regulates states’ use of private counsel, 
which may skew state enforcement incentives. In some cases it 
has barred contingency-fee arrangements with private counsel; 
in others it has limited the ability of private counsel to exploit 
information they obtain in state representations for personal 
benefit.90
 
 The presence, or absence, of these various design fea-
tures is clearly relevant in assessing the costs of a particular 
concurrent enforcement regime. 
***** 
 
In some cases, a review of the foregoing structural factors 
may make clear that concurrent state enforcement is unlikely 
to create significant costs, and the analysis might properly end 
here. In other cases, however, these factors may suggest that 
concurrent enforcement has the potential to be quite costly, ne-
cessitating a closer examination of federal and state enforce-
ment behavior to determine if those costs are likely outweighed 
by concurrent enforcement’s benefits. 
C. THE FEDERAL ENFORCER 
The benefit of concurrent state-federal enforcement most 
stressed in the literature is its ability to protect against lax 
federal enforcement. But all federal enforcement agencies are 
not created equal. Some might, in fact, under-enforce if granted 
an enforcement monopoly—but others might enforce at optimal 
 
 87. Widman & Cox, supra note 2, at 61. 
 88. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 2, at 760 (“When state enforcement is con-
fined to federal court—and particularly when it is linked to agency regula-
tions—the possibility that state enforcers will target behavior that federal pol-
icy makers have condoned is significantly reduced.”); Widman & Cox, supra 
note 2, at 61. 
 89. Widman & Cox, supra note 2, at 62. 
 90. Id. at 63. 
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levels, or even over-enforce. The political economy in which the 
relevant agency operates must be carefully examined before a 
judgment can be reached about the need for state enforcement 
as a check on federal enforcement laxity. Will the regulated 
parties who exert influence on the agency prefer under-
enforcement? What sway do competing interest groups have 
over agency enforcement policy? Does agency culture influence 
its enforcement behavior independently of interest group pres-
sure, and if so what impact does it have? Do other administra-
tive law checks effectively insulate the agency from capture?91
It should be noted that whether a federal agency “under-
enforces” in a particular area will often be a contested issue. 
But if there is a shared understanding as to the federal law’s 
purpose, such disputes will turn on empirical rather than nor-
mative questions. What if there is unresolvable empirical un-
certainty as to how much, or what type of, enforcement is need-
ed to achieve a shared policy goal? In such cases, deference 
should be afforded to the opinion of the current administra-
tion—those who lost the political fight for the White House 
cannot credibly claim that an agency is “under-enforcing” simp-
ly because they have a different intuition as to the best en-
forcement approach. 
 
If not, could they be implemented at less cost than concurrent 
state enforcement? What is, in fact, the agency’s enforcement 
track record? All of these questions must be considered before it 
can be concluded that concurrent enforcement is necessary to 
remedy federal under-enforcement. 
D. THE STATE ENFORCER(S)  
An under-studied, yet hugely important, variable affecting 
the desirability of concurrent state-federal enforcement is how 
exactly states will use their enforcement authority. An array of 
possibilities exist. For example, as explained in Part II.A, a 
state may bring enforcement actions that are profitable for it 
even when they do not create net social benefits. If a state can 
impose a large fine on an out-of-state defendant at little cost to 
itself, it is in its selfish interest to do so even if such behavior 
imposes negative externalities on the rest of the country in the 
form of over-deterrence costs. We might call this the “Rent 
Seeking Hypothesis.” If true, it suggests that concurrent state 
enforcement is socially undesirable. 
 
 91. For a good review of the options, see Barkow, supra note 2.  
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Traditional theories of cooperative federalism suggest an 
alternative possibility: State enforcers might work together 
with federal enforcers, efficiently sharing the enforcement bur-
den.92
The Cooperation Hypothesis stands in tension with recent 
literature on concurrent state enforcement, however, as it 
seems to assume public-spiritedness on the part of regulators 
at both layers of government. This recent literature assumes, 
by contrast, that federal enforcement agencies will systemati-
cally under-enforce, due to capture or other bureaucratic pa-
thologies, and views state enforcement as a potential correc-
tive.
 For example, a federal enforcer might take the enforce-
ment lead when it enjoys a comparative enforcement advantage 
relative to a state enforcer (such as a better ability to investi-
gate crimes with a multistate dimension), and a state enforcer 
might step in when it has an advantage over the federal enforc-
er (such as when most of the witnesses and evidence are locat-
ed within the state). We might call this the “Cooperation Hy-
pothesis.” If this hypothesis is true, it suggests that concurrent 
state enforcement is socially beneficial. 
93
One possible response to this critique is that state enforc-
ers are more accountable to the electorate than federal agen-
cies, and thus less subject to capture by industry. But this may 
not be the case in every regulatory context, or in every state.
 We might call this the “Vacuum Filling Hypothesis,” as it 
reflects the notion that state enforcers will act to fill federal en-
forcement gaps. But if the Cooperation Hypothesis stands in 
tension with the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis, the Vacuum Fill-
ing Hypothesis stands in tension with itself. Is it logical to as-
sume that states will act in a national-regarding way, while 
simultaneously assuming federal enforcers will not? Are state 
enforcers uniquely immune from the selfish impulses public 
choice theory ascribes to government actors? 
94
 
 92. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Fed-
eralism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998) (“[I]ndependent governments work[] together to 
implement federal policy.”). 
 
As with determining the likelihood of federal under-
 93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 94. For example, only 36% of state securities enforcers are elected. See in-
fra note 223 and accompanying text. See also Jill E. Fisch, Institutional Com-
petition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 617, 624 (2005) (observing that “[i]t should virtually always be easier for 
an industry, such as the financial services industry, to capture the state level 
of regulation than to capture the Congress and the SEC”). 
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enforcement, a detailed appraisal of the political economy in 
which state enforcers operate is necessary before conclusions 
can be reached about state enforcement behavior. A related ar-
gument is that the increased difficulty of capturing multiple en-
forcers alone makes capture less likely. But this argument 
works only for interest groups desiring less enforcement. Those 
who favor excessive enforcement need capture only one to suc-
ceed, and the existence of multiple enforcers to choose from 
makes that easier to do. Which interests groups would favor 
excessive enforcement? Again, the answer is necessarily con-
text specific. In some regulatory areas, it might be none, allevi-
ating this concern. In others, it might be the trial bar, if the 
state collaborates with private counsel in its enforcement ef-
forts. Firms might also favor opportunistic state litigation if 
targeted at competitors. It is necessary to weigh the increased 
potential for capture-induced over-deterrence against the de-
creased potential for capture-induced under-deterrence when 
evaluating the net impact of concurrent state enforcement. 
Even if it is true that state enforcers are less subject to 
capture than their federal counterparts, it would seemingly en-
sure only that state enforcers acted to promote their particular 
state’s welfare, whereas the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis as-
sumes they will act to advance the national welfare. And recall 
that when federal intervention is warranted due to interstate 
externalities, states’ interests will never align perfectly with 
national interests. That said, in some situations particular 
states may have enough to gain by filling a federal enforcement 
vacuum that they may be willing to incur the costs of doing so, 
even though they cannot fully internalize the benefits of their 
actions.95
As with the Cooperation Hypothesis, the Vacuum Filling 
Hypothesis suggests that concurrent state enforcement plays a 
socially useful function. But a word of caution is in order: State 
enforcers might be wrong, even if well-intentioned. They (or the 
electorates they represent) may misinterpret a reasoned exer-
cise of discretionary non-enforcement at the federal level as a 
“vacuum” that needs filling. Good policy reasons exist for put-
 
 
 95. It might also be the case that state electorates are more other-
regarding than rational actor models predict. If so, perhaps they can be count-
ed on to sublimate their state’s parochial interests and support enforcement 
policies that they believe are in the national interest. Of course, if states really 
could be counted on to behave this way, it would undermine the case for a fed-
eral enforcement role. See supra Part II.A. 
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ting enforcement decisions into the hands of expert agencies, 
and insulating them from day-to-day political pressures. Most 
notably, some types of misconduct rouse populist sentiment 
that might lead elected, generalist state enforcers to pursue en-
forcement policies that are not in the nation’s long-term best 
interest.96
The idea that politics may drive state enforcement deci-
sions gives rise to a fourth hypothesis, one we might label the 
“Political Entrepreneur Hypothesis.” This hypothesis, which is 
consistent with public choice accounts of regulatory behavior, 
posits that state enforcement decisions are driven as much by 
the individuals making them as by considerations of state or 
national welfare. For example, politically ambitious state regu-
lators may exercise their concurrent enforcement authority in 
order to reward campaign donors or to gain publicity, which 
can aid in future electability. Unlike the other three, this hy-
pothesis, if true, does not speak directly to the social value of 
concurrent state enforcement. Political ambition may lead state 
regulators to exercise their enforcement authority in socially 
detrimental ways, or it may lead them to act in ways that pro-
mote the nation’s best interests. The latter is more likely if the 
regulator is beholden to a constituency that is both concerned 
with and knowledgeable about the impact of the regulator’s en-
forcement choices on national welfare. It is less likely if the 
regulator is beholden to a constituency that favors the states’ 
parochial interests, or which suffers from behavioral biases 
that lead it to favor enforcement without considering the less 
salient costs of regulatory action.
 
97
The point of this discussion is not to claim that states will 
behave in any particular way, but simply to demonstrate that 
predicting how states will use their enforcement authority is 
extremely complex—and yet critical to any informed evaluation 
of the net benefits of a concurrent state-federal enforcement re-
 
 
 96. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 19–21 (explaining the idea that agencies 
should be “insulated from short-term political pressures so that [they can] 
adopt public policies based on expertise that would yield better public policy 
over the long term”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Fu-
ture of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 613 (2010) (“Perhaps the 
most powerful justification for committing certain decisions to independent 
agencies was that officials within such agencies would make difficult yet ulti-
mately beneficial decisions that politicians would not.”).  
 97. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2005) (explaining how “[o]pportunistic politi-
cians may take advantage of the biases of the electorate, playing up recent in-
stances of fraud to gain electoral support”). 
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gime. Each of the hypotheses introduced above could be evalu-
ated empirically in concrete regulatory settings to get a better 
sense of what actually motivates state enforcement behavior—
and what it means for the value of concurrent enforcement. The 
case study that follows does just that in the securities fraud 
context. 
 
***** 
 
This Part has demonstrated that the desirably of concur-
rent state-federal enforcement in a particular regulatory area 
is highly contingent on a variety of factors. A sophisticated ap-
preciation of the regulatory context is therefore necessary be-
fore such a judgment can be made, as is an empirically-
grounded understanding of how both the relevant federal and 
state enforcers use their enforcement authority. What follows is 
a case study of concurrent state-federal enforcement in the se-
curities fraud context that seeks to follow this advice. 
III.  A CASE STUDY OF CONCURRENT SECURITIES 
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AGAINST NATIONALLY TRADED 
FIRMS   
Numerous scholars have observed that case studies are 
needed to better appreciate how concurrent state-federal en-
forcement regimes fare in real world policy settings.98 Part II 
provides the tools needed to conduct such a case study in a 
principled way. This Part now applies those tools to evaluate 
the concurrent state-federal securities fraud enforcement re-
gime. This regime is a particularly good candidate for evalua-
tion, as the wisdom of the United States’ multi-enforcer ap-
proach to securities fraud deterrence has come under 
considerable fire in recent years.99
 
 98. See supra note 
 Most of the scholarly atten-
12 and accompanying text. 
 99. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political 
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011) (arguing that 
fraud-on-the-market securities class actions should be eliminated and replaced 
with stepped-up public enforcement efforts); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the 
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007) (suggesting 
that flaws in private securities enforcement may warrant increased reliance 
on public enforcement); Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: 
An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2011) (arguing for more tar-
geted deterrence of corporate fraud); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public 
and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. 
FIN. ECON. 207 (2009) (questioning the effectiveness of private enforcement 
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tion has been focused on the overlap between SEC and class ac-
tion enforcement, however, leaving the allocation of enforce-
ment authority as between the states and the federal govern-
ment understudied. 
Part III.A provides a quick background on the development 
of this particular concurrent enforcement regime, and the sig-
nificant controversy it has engendered. Part III.B then analyz-
es its potential costs and benefits by reference to the contextual 
factors identified in Part II. The case study is continued in Part 
IV, which reports on empirical findings concerning the en-
forcement behavior of state securities regulators vis-à-vis na-
tionally traded firms. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The federal government did not enter the business of secu-
rities regulation until the 1930s. When it did so, under-
regulation and under-enforcement at the state level was the an-
imating concern.100 Specifically, the New Deal Congress be-
lieved that state securities laws—known as “Blue Sky Laws”—
had been ineffective in deterring abuses that contributed to the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depres-
sion.101 Thus, both the Securities Act of 1933 (which regulates 
the primary offering of securities) and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (which, among other things, creates ongoing period-
ic disclosure obligations for firms that have gone “public”) sup-
plemented but did not displace state securities laws.102
 
relative to public enforcement); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litiga-
tion Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private En-
forcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (arguing that SEC 
oversight of securities class actions would lead to efficiency gains); Rose, supra 
note 
 For the 
next sixty-plus years, federal regulation of securities offerings, 
24 (questioning whether the preconditions for efficient use of multiple se-
curities law enforcers exist in the United States); see also COMM. ON CAPITAL 
MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MAR-
KETS REGULATION 9–10, 68–69 (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/ 
pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (encouraging greater coordi-
nation between state and federal securities regulators). 
 100. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 
1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (describing the motivation of Congress in 
implementing securities litigation).  
 101. For a critical history of state securities regulation, see Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347 
(1991). 
 102. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2006); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006).  
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mandatory corporate disclosure, and securities fraud existed 
concurrently with state regulation. 
This changed in 1996 when Congress enacted the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA).103 At that mo-
ment in history, over-regulation and its impact on the competi-
tiveness of our national capital markets was the primary con-
cern in Congress.104 In connection with NSMIA’s adoption, the 
Committee of Conference described concurrent state-federal se-
curities regulation as “redundant, costly, and ineffective,” and 
noted testimony that it “tends to raise the cost of capital to 
American issuers of securities without providing commensurate 
protection to investors or to our markets.”105 NSMIA thus 
sought “to firmly ensconce the SEC as ‘the exclusive regulator 
of national offerings of securities.’”106 To achieve this, NSMIA 
broadly preempted state authority to regulate the offering of 
“covered securities”—which include securities traded on na-
tional exchanges—as well as the ongoing disclosure obligations 
of the firms issuing them.107 NSMIA expressly preserved, how-
ever, the authority of state securities commissions (or like state 
agencies) to bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or 
deceit.108 In 1998 Congress preempted securities class actions 
brought under state law against nationally traded firms, but 
again expressly preserved the authority of state regulators to 
pursue these firms for fraud or deceit.109
The wisdom of preserving a concurrent state securities 
fraud enforcement role vis-à-vis nationally traded firms has 
been hotly debated for over a decade now.
 Thus, while states to-
day cannot apply their own ex ante mandatory disclosure and 
offering rules to nationally traded firms, state regulators can 
use their own fraud rules to police those firms’ disclosures ex 
post. 
110
 
 103. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (1996). 
 Eliot Spitzer is 
 104. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39–40 (1996).  
 105. Id. at 39. 
 106. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations 
Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 124 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, 
at 16 (1996)). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 77r. 
 108. Id. § 77r(c). 
 109. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). 
 110. For a recent overview of the debate, see Park, supra note 57, at 120–
28. 
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largely responsible for this. It was NSMIA’s fraud carve-out 
that allowed him to bring high-profile enforcement actions to 
remedy Wall Street abuses during his tenure as New York At-
torney General (NYAG). Spitzer utilized his preserved author-
ity to bring numerous actions against nationally traded com-
panies pursuant to New York’s turbo-charged Martin Act.111 
For example, Spitzer pursued major brokerage houses for 
allegedly producing biased analyst research.112 He also pur-
sued several major mutual fund advisors for permitting fa-
vored fund investors to engage in late trading and market 
timing, undisclosed practices that worked to dilute the returns 
of longer-term investors.113 Some lauded Spitzer’s actions as 
promoting the goal of optimal deterrence at a time when the 
SEC was asleep at the switch; others criticized his actions as 
politically motivated and ultimately harmful to our capital 
markets.114 The NYAG’s office continues to make controversial 
enforcement decisions,115 provoking calls for reform by indus-
try groups.116
 
 111. The Martin Act grants the New York Attorney General broad powers 
to investigate securities fraud. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (Consol. 2012); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (Consol. 2012). Prosecutions under the Act require no 
showing of scienter or intent to defraud, and its use of the terms “fraud” and 
“fraudulent practice” is read to “include all deceitful practices contrary to the 
plain rules of common honesty.” People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 330 
N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). 
 
 112. John Cassidy, How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, NEW YORKER, 
Apr. 7, 2003, at 55.  
 113. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spitzer Legacy and the Cuomo Future, 329 
N.Y. L.J. 5, 5 (2008).  
 114. See Eric Zitzewitz, An Eliot Effect? Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual 
Fund Settlement Negotiations, 2003-7, at 2–3 nn.1–3 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1091035. Some were especially critical of Spitzer’s apparent effort to make 
structural changes to the financial markets through his settlements with de-
fendants. See infra note 244. Spitzer’s actions were so controversial they 
prompted what became known as the “anti-Spitzer amendment” to the Securi-
ties Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th 
Cong. (2003). The amendment would have limited state enforcement authori-
ty. See Johnathan Mathiesen, Dr. Spitzlove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worry-
ing and Love “Balkanization”, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 311, 316 (2006) (dis-
cussing the demise of this legislation). 
 115. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 113, at 5; Amir Efrati et al., Prosecutors 
Widen Probes into Subprime, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2008, at C1; Kara Scannell 
& Dan Fitzpatrick, SEC Clashes with Cuomo over Firing in BofA Case, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, at C1. 
 116. See, e.g., Robert A. McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act: Preemption 
Delayed Is Justice Denied, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 1–3 (2011); see also Reed 
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B. ANALYSIS 
As discussed below, both the rationale for federal involve-
ment and each of the structural factors identified in Part II.B—
the breadth of the substantive prohibition, whether states are 
enforcing federal law or analogous state laws, the number of 
states with overlapping jurisdiction, and the presence (or, in 
this case, absence) of safeguards—suggest that concurrent 
state-federal securities fraud enforcement against nationally 
traded firms has the potential to be quite costly. Evaluating the 
actual enforcement behavior of federal and state securities reg-
ulators is therefore key to determining concurrent enforce-
ment’s net impact. But these factors are harder to judge. Schol-
ars take divergent views on the efficacy of the SEC, and this 
Article does not attempt to resolve that debate. As for state en-
forcement, there has been a marked lack of empirical data on 
which to assess its contribution to securities fraud deterrence. 
The next Part begins to fill that void.  
 
***** 
 
As explained in Part II.A, when analyzing the desirability 
of concurrent state-federal enforcement authority it is neces-
sary to begin with an understanding of the purpose of federal 
intervention in the particular substantive area under examina-
tion. Regulating the accuracy of disclosures by nationally trad-
ed firms creates positive interstate externalities and is widely 
perceived to be a proper topic of federal interest for this rea-
son.117 If investors who participate in the national capital mar-
kets fear that firms are releasing inaccurate or incomplete in-
formation, they can be expected to discount what they are 
willing to pay for all securities.118 This works to increase the 
cost of capital, with negative consequences for the entire econ-
omy.119
 
Albergotti et al., Sharp Elbows Among Street Lawmen, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 
2012, at C1. 
 Securities fraud by nationally traded firms also upsets 
 117. But see generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETI-
TIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002) (advocating for a com-
petitive regime); cf. John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities 
Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2001) (ar-
guing that the decision to regulate or privatize must consider political implica-
tions). 
 118. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673–74 (1984). 
 119. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
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the efficient allocation of resources in the country, as it impedes 
the flow of funds to their highest valued use.120
But state level under-enforcement is not the only relevant 
concern. Bringing securities fraud cases against nationally 
traded firms can also produce in-state benefits while creating 
negative interstate externalities, in the form of over-deterrence 
costs.
 Deterring inac-
curate and incomplete disclosures by nationally traded firms 
thus creates benefits that are shared nationwide, and individu-
al states might therefore rationally underinvest in the effort. 
As noted above, it was Congress’s concern that states were un-
der-enforcing that animated it to get involved in securities reg-
ulation in the first place. 
121 An optimal deterrence regime would not deter fraud at 
any cost, but rather would minimize the sum of under- and 
over-deterrence costs, as well as the other more direct costs of 
the enforcement regime.122 Over-deterrence would not be a seri-
ous concern if securities fraud liability were directed only at in-
dividuals, and the scienter requirement were applied with 
100% accuracy.123 Under these assumptions, people could avoid 
liability simply by choosing not to defraud—an unambiguously 
good outcome, since fraud has no social value.124 But firms (and, 
ultimately, their shareholders) are held vicariously liable for 
securities fraud in the United States, and shareholders may be 
unable to prevent renegade managers from committing fraud. 
Moreover, securities fraud prohibitions, at least when written 
in broad terms (as they typically are), carry a nontrivial risk of 
legal error. In particular, omissions, forward-looking state-
ments, and opinions may be judged to have been made with 
fraudulent intent even when they were not.125
 
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1565 (2006) 
(“When the cost of capital rises, the economy as a whole suffers, as Gross Na-
tional Product declines or stagnates, and unemployment may increase. As a 
result, not only investors, but also citizens throughout society experience a 
loss.”). 
 Moreover, so-
called “aiders and abetters,” like auditors or investment banks, 
 120. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 118, at 673. 
 121. Rose, supra note 24, at 2184.  
 122. Id. at 2178–79.  
 123. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability 
for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 
691, 692 (1992) (“Fraud on the Market is optimally deterred when agents are 
induced to refrain from fraud altogether, consequently, overdeterrence is not 
an issue.”). 
 124. See id.  
 125. Id. at 2185–86.  
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can be charged with having known about, and assisted, frauds 
that they were in fact unaware of.126
The risk of these sorts of mistaken fraud prosecutions can 
produce over-deterrence costs that look very much like the un-
der-deterrence costs the system is meant to prevent. If regula-
tors aggressively pursue forecasts and other opinions, it may 
prompt even honest individuals to disclose less of this type of 
information, impeding share price accuracy.
  
127 Conversely, the 
aggressive pursuit of omissions might cause individuals to 
spend too much firm money in the production of information, or 
to flood the market with trivial information—which can like-
wise impede share price accuracy.128 Less accurate share prices 
mean, in turn, less allocative efficiency in the economy and a 
higher cost of capital. The risk of erroneous fraud liability 
might also lead firms to spend more money scrubbing docu-
ments for accuracy than is socially optimal. In addition, finan-
cial intermediaries might charge firms more for their services 
as compensation for the risk of erroneous aiding and abetting 
liability. Finally, when vicarious liability is a feature of the sys-
tem, excessive sanctions might cause firms to overinvest in 
measures to prevent fraud and misrepresentation, even absent 
a risk of legal error.129
Enforcement discretion can therefore be a very useful de-
vice in the securities fraud context. I have argued elsewhere 
that it is in fact a superior way of mitigating over-deterrence 
costs than the alternative of narrowing the breadth of the fraud 
prohibition, or rigidly altering procedural rules or sanctions.
 
130
 
 126. Id. at 2187.  
 
Unlike the latter approaches, which necessarily weaken the 
 127. See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Re-
form on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology 
Firms, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 297, 298 (2001) (finding an increase in company fore-
casts after legislation restricted the ability of private parties to bring securi-
ties fraud suits based on forward-looking information).  
 128. See generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Over-
load and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 
(2003).  
 129. Vicarious liability is not meant to deter unconditionally, the way a 
fraud prohibition directed at individuals is meant to; rather, it is meant to 
cause the owners of the firm to internalize the potential social costs of their 
employees’ frauds so as to invest socially optimal amounts in prevention. See 
generally Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 
NW. L. REV. 1679, 1683–85 (2011) (questioning this rationale for vicarious lia-
bility in the securities fraud context, given that diversified shareholders have 
natural incentives to prevent fraud).  
 130. Rose, supra note 24, at 2193–97. 
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ability of the regime to deter fraud, enforcement discretion—if 
wisely employed—can reduce over-deterrence costs without the 
same stark tradeoff in the form of increased under-deterrence 
costs. For example, a well-incentivized federal enforcer could 
reduce the fear of erroneous prosecution through careful en-
forcement choices. It could also reassure firms that vicarious 
liability will not be imposed even if a renegade employee com-
mits fraud, so long as reasonable internal controls were in 
place. When concurrent state enforcers are introduced, howev-
er, the federal government’s control over these policy levers is 
surrendered. And it is surrendered to states with skewed incen-
tives, due to the potential for fraud prosecutions against na-
tionally traded firms to create interstate externalities. Un-
doubtedly state enforcement is less problematic in this regard 
than profit-driven private enforcement,131
Thus, both the rationale for federal intervention (to deal 
with interstate externalities) and the nature of the substantive 
prohibition (broad and prone to legal error) suggest that con-
current state enforcement in the securities fraud context may 
lead to policy distortion and, consequently, raise democratic 
concerns. The magnitude of these costs may be exacerbated by 
the fact that states are permitted to apply their own state secu-
rities fraud laws, rather than to simply enforce federal securi-
ties fraud prohibitions.
 but it is problematic 
nevertheless. 
132 Some have criticized New York’s Mar-
tin Act, for example, as distorting national policy because it 
differs from federal securities fraud prohibitions in important 
respects. For instance, the “fraud” proscribed by the Martin Act 
does not require a showing of scienter.133
 
 131. In the United States, there is a third type of securities fraud enforcer 
that should not be overlooked: the entrepreneurial “private attorney general” 
who brings Rule 10b-5 class actions against nationally traded firms. As I have 
argued elsewhere, this type of enforcer can likewise undermine the federal 
government’s effective use of prosecutorial discretion as a tool for mitigating 
over-deterrence costs. See generally Rose, supra note 99. Although private en-
forcement’s capacity to upset federal policy goals has been cabined somewhat 
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
 The Martin Act also 
109 Stat. 737 (1995), it remains problematic. See generally Amanda M. Rose, 
Fraud on the Market: An Action Without A Cause, 160 PENNUMBRA 87 (2011).  
 132. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 118, at 706 (noting that 
“[s]tate courts, acting under state law, have used a much broader definition of 
materiality, giving credence to the interstate exploitation hypothesis”). States 
can enforce federal fraud prohibitions only in a proprietary capacity, to recoup 
investment losses suffered by the state.  
 133. Id.  
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confers on the NYAG powerful tools of pre-suit discovery which 
some contend may be used to strong-arm defendants into set-
tling.134
In addition, because federal law simply preserves states’ 
authority to enforce their own laws, there are none of the safe-
guards discussed in Part II.B.4 that are often part of concur-
rent regimes involving the enforcement of federal law. State se-
curities regulators need not inform the SEC of their 
investigations or enforcement actions against nationally traded 
firms. Nothing limits state regulatory remedies, or prevents 
states from bringing actions in cases where the SEC has 
brought parallel proceedings. Moreover, the SEC has no right 
to intervene in state proceedings. Although a presidential di-
rective prevents federal agencies from retaining private counsel 
on a contingency-fee basis,
 
135
Concurrent state enforcement may also be particularly 
costly in the securities fraud context because of the number of 
states that enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with the federal gov-
ernment. State jurisdiction over securities fraud is not limited 
to states where the offending firm is headquartered or incorpo-
rated. Instead, it typically extends to all states where an offer 
or sale of the firm’s securities has been made.
 the use of private counsel by state 
agencies is unregulated by federal law. 
136 Thus, each of 
the fifty states could likely assert jurisdiction over a nationally 
traded firm based on the same alleged misstatement or omis-
sion, because at least one resident is likely to have purchased 
the firm’s shares while the misstatement or omission was al-
legedly distorting the price. A public firm cannot effectively 
limit the investors who purchase its shares in the secondary 
market based on state residency, so it has no choice but to ex-
pose itself to this level of jurisdictional overlap.137
 
 134. For example, the Martin Act authorizes the NYAG to issue subpoenas 
compelling testimony without granting the subpoenaed person a right to coun-
sel or a right against self-incrimination—a witness’s failure to comply renders 
him or her guilty of a misdemeanor, and a defendant’s failure to comply con-
stitutes prima facie proof of fraud and warrants a permanent injunction bar-
ring him or her from further participation in the securities industry. See N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352, 354 (McKinney 2012); Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Po-
litical Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Govern-
ance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 
960–61 (2005); McTamaney, supra note 116, at 1. 
  
 135. Exec. Order No. 13433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28, 441–42 (May 18, 2007). 
 136. ROMANO, supra note 117, at 115.  
 137. See id. (discussing choice-of-law approach to securities transactions); 
Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities 
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As discussed in Part II.B.3, having numerous states with 
jurisdiction increases the costs of concurrent enforcement in a 
variety of ways. For example, it raises the possibility of dupli-
cative enforcement actions and policy distortion, and heightens 
accountability concerns. But it also increases the potential ben-
efits of concurrent enforcement, most importantly its ability to 
serve as a meaningful check on federal enforcement laxity—the 
more states with jurisdiction, the less likely industry will suc-
ceed in capturing them all. The importance of this added bene-
fit depends, of course, on whether federal enforcement laxity is 
a serious concern in the securities fraud context, or more pre-
cisely on whether it would be in the absence of concurrent state 
enforcement.  
This is not an easy question to answer. Scandals, such as 
those involving Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford, have cer-
tainly sullied the SEC’s reputation in recent years. But histori-
cally the agency has enjoyed a positive reputation.138 It is an 
independent agency, with the traditional safeguards from exec-
utive dominance.139 In addition, to promote bipartisan 
decisionmaking no more than three of the SEC’s five commis-
sioners can have the same political affiliation.140 The SEC is al-
so well-funded and well-staffed, at least relative to many other 
federal agencies.141 Scholarly research has shown that the SEC 
brings more enforcement actions and imposes greater monetary 
sanctions than its European counterparts by orders of magni-
tude, even when the numbers are adjusted to reflect relative 
market size.142
 
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 325–26 (1998) (same). 
  
 138. For a comprehensive history of the SEC, see generally JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003). See also 
Coates, supra note 121, at 543–44 (“[T]he SEC remains a highly respected 
government agency, even among political constituencies otherwise inclined to 
doubt the value or abilities of government regulators.”).  
 139. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 96, at 610 (discussing the 
hallmarks of independent agencies); but see id. at 637–47 (discussing mecha-
nisms that nevertheless cause the SEC to be responsive to presidential prefer-
ences). 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
 141. In the 2011 fiscal year, the SEC enjoyed a budget of over $1.6 billion, 
boasted 3844 full-time employees, brought 735 enforcement actions, and ob-
tained orders for $2.8 billion in penalties and disgorgement. FY 2011 Perfor-
mance and Accountability Report, SEC (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf. 
 142. Coffee, supra note 99, at 262, 268–74 (discussing and updating figures 
reported in Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regula-
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Nevertheless, many scholars argue that the SEC is under-
funded and understaffed given the scope of its responsibili-
ties.143 Many also contend that the SEC is subject to capture 
and that its personnel are seduced by the lure of a “revolving 
door,” leading to under-deterrence.144 As I have discussed in de-
tail elsewhere, these sorts of arguments are premised on im-
portant unstated assumptions that should be identified, and 
their veracity examined.145 Rather than rehash that analysis 
here, I will assume that SEC enforcement laxity is in fact a se-
rious concern. I will also assume that there are no other fixes, 
short of adopting a concurrent enforcement regime, which 
might remedy the SEC’s problems at less cost.146
The question still remains whether state enforcement does 
more good, by checking or correcting the SEC’s tendency to un-
der-enforce and producing other benefits, than harm, by creat-
ing over-deterrence and other costs. The features of concurrent 
state securities fraud enforcement discussed above suggest it 
has the potential to create significant costs. But whether it does 
in fact depends on how states actually choose to utilize their en-
forcement authority. The same is true of its potential to pro-
duce the benefits traditionally associated with concurrent en-
  
 
tion: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 
(2007)). 
 143. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 35 at 126–27 (“Because the SEC lacks ade-
quate resources to effectively police the national securities market, supple-
mental enforcement is essential to achieve an appropriate level of deter-
rence.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities 
Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 652 (1996) (accepting this as “the conventional 
view”). 
 144. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as 
Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 99 (2008) (discussing the 
need to guard against “selective enforcement and inaction by the SEC”); Jones, 
supra note 35, at 122 (arguing in favor of concurrent state securities enforce-
ment because “the existence of multiple layers of government makes regulato-
ry capture a more arduous task for interest groups”); Macey, supra note 134, 
at 958 (suggesting the SEC’s passivity in the wake of corporate scandals “was 
likely caused by the agency’s capture by the very special interests it was os-
tensibly regulating”); cf. Fisch, supra note 94, at 623 (noting the increasing 
“power of a variety of other interest groups,” including shareholders, trial law-
yers, and employees). 
 145. Rose, supra note 24, at 2212–19; see generally Ed DeHaan et al., Does 
the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes? (July 2012) (un-
published manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2125560 (finding evidence inconsistent with the claim that revolving doors 
undermine the SEC’s enforcement efforts). 
 146. But see Rose, supra note 24, at 2224–29 (discussing a variety of SEC-
focused reforms that might improve the securities fraud deterrence regime at 
lower cost than concurrent enforcement). 
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forcement. To get at the answer to this question, then, empiri-
cal research is needed. The next Part reports on the most com-
prehensive empirical examination of state securities enforce-
ment behavior against nationally traded firms undertaken to 
date. 
IV.  STATE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT   
While the role of federal public enforcement and private 
class action enforcement of the securities laws has been well 
studied,147 almost no empirical research has been done on state 
regulatory enforcement. The debate over NSMIA’s fraud carve-
out has therefore been based on anecdotal accounts of high-
profile enforcement efforts by New York and a handful of other 
states. To begin to fill this gap in the literature, I and a co-
author constructed a unique dataset of litigation-related disclo-
sures drawn from the fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006 annual 
reports filed with the SEC by every domestic firm that listed 
common stock on the NYSE at any point between February 29, 
2000 and December 31, 2010.148
Of the 538 companies in the dataset disclosing some form 
of securities litigation in at least one of their examined Form 
10-Ks, 8% disclosed a state regulatory investigation or action.
 This involved a review of 5441 
Form 10-Ks filed by 1977 distinct companies. Among other 
things, we tracked whether the companies disclosed some form 
of securities litigation and, if so, what type. We also recorded 
detailed information about the securities-related state regula-
tory investigations and actions that were disclosed.  
149
 
 147. For helpful summaries of the extant literature, see James D. Cox & 
Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience, 
6 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 164 (2009). For an older survey focused on private 
enforcement, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1468–1504 (2004). 
 
A total of 42 companies reported 102 distinct securities-related 
 148. Amanda M. Rose & Larry J. LeBlanc, Policing Public Companies: An 
Empirical Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by 
State Securities Regulators, 65 FLA. L. REV 448, 452–57 (2013) (describing the 
data collection process). We chose to focus on NYSE listed firms because the 
NYSE is by far the largest U.S. stock exchange by market capitalization; fo-
cusing on firms that listed common stock on that exchange over a ten year pe-
riod thus gave us a window into the litigation experiences of a broad set of 
U.S. public companies. We chose to focus on these firms’ disclosed litigation 
experiences in the years 2004–2006 in order to maximize the likelihood that 
the litigation would be completed.  
 149. Id. at 460 (Table 1). 
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state regulatory matters, 90 of which we could attribute to par-
ticular states.150 By contrast, 45% of these 538 companies dis-
closed being the target of a securities-related federal regulatory 
investigation or action in at least one of their examined Form 
10-Ks,151 and 74% reported being targeted in a securities class 
action.152
This is consistent with theory. As explained above, policing 
public companies for securities fraud can serve a deterrent 
function that helps to maintain the health of our national capi-
tal markets, a benefit that necessarily transcends the bounda-
ries of any particular state. It can also be very costly to do. If 
states are rational actors, one might therefore expect them to 
do little to combat securities fraud by public companies, and to 
instead free-ride on the efforts of the federal government or 
other states (focusing their limited resources on more localized 
issues, with fewer spillover benefits). The data suggest that 
most states act in this expected way. Indeed, a clear majority of 
states (thirty-two) were not identified as having brought any 
securities-related investigations or actions against the compa-
nies in the dataset.
 Thus, at least relative to these other forms of securi-
ties enforcement, the level of disclosed activity by state enforc-
ers was low. 
153 Of course, this does not mean that these 
states’ securities regulators were not hard at work; the more 
appropriate inference is that they were directing their scarce 
resources to securities-related misconduct of a more local ilk.154
But the data also reveal four states that were fairly active. 
New York, West Virginia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts 
were each disclosed as having brought between eight and thir-
ty-one securities-related investigations or actions against the 
companies in the dataset.
  
155 These states were alone responsi-
ble for 70% of the ninety disclosed matters attributable to par-
ticular states.156
 
 150. Id. at 466 (Table 4). 
 Another fourteen states were disclosed to have 
 151. We defined federal regulatory matters to include those “brought by the 
SEC, securities-related criminal matters brought by the Department of Jus-
tice, and enforcement matters initiated by SEC supervised self-regulatory or-
ganizations.” Id. at 455 n.18. 
 152. Id. at 460 (Table 1). 
 153. Id. at 467.  
 154. “For example, states have played an important role in protecting el-
ders from securities scams as well as in policing for fraud in the sale of unreg-
istered securities.” Id. at 466 n.51. 
 155. See id. at 22 (Table 6). 
 156. Id. 
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brought between one and four actions or investigations.157
Part IV.A, below, describes some basic characteristics of 
the securities-related state regulatory matters disclosed in the 
dataset. Part IV.B then discusses the results of my hypothesis 
testing. To preview those results, each hypothesis finds some 
support in the data. Consistent with the Political Entrepreneur 
Hypothesis, states with elected securities regulators were much 
more active than states with appointed securities regulators, 
even when controlling for other differences that might be ex-
pected to influence a state’s enforcement activity. Consistent 
with the Cooperation Hypothesis, in some cases it appears that 
state regulators took the enforcement lead against public com-
panies when they enjoyed an enforcement advantage relative to 
federal regulators. In the vast majority of cases, however, I ob-
served more conflict than coordination, with both state and fed-
eral regulators pursuing the same companies for the same mis-
conduct. Many of these cases—in particular those brought by 
the NYAG—appear consistent with the Vacuum Filling Hy-
pothesis, as they involved a state with a special concern for the 
health of the capital markets exposing widespread securities-
related misconduct, jolting a restful SEC into action. A nontriv-
ial number, however, were “piggyback” actions brought by West 
Virginia—a state with no special connection to the capital mar-
kets, the defendants, or the alleged misconduct. Consistent 
with the Rent Seeking Hypothesis, West Virginia sought signif-
icant monetary penalties against the targeted firms (and, indi-
rectly, their public shareholders) for misconduct that had al-
ready been exposed and seriously sanctioned by other 
regulators. These results indicate that NSMIA’s fraud carve-
 The 
interesting question is not why there were so few securities-
related state regulatory matters disclosed, but rather why some 
states saw fit to bring any at all. What motivates some states to 
act while others sit on the sidelines? As discussed in Part II.D, 
predicting how or why states will use their concurrent enforce-
ment authority is a complex task, and yet understanding state 
enforcement behavior is necessary to intelligently evaluate the 
social value of NSMIA’s fraud carve-out. I therefore used this 
unique dataset to evaluate (both qualitatively and, where pos-
sible, quantitatively) the plausibility of the four hypotheses 
about state enforcement behavior introduced in Part II.D—the 
Vacuum Filling, Rent Seeking, Cooperation, and Political En-
trepreneur Hypotheses. 
 
 157. Id. 
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out has produced both social costs and social benefits. In the fi-
nal section of this Part, I will discuss nuanced reforms that 
might preserve the carve-out’s positive potential while mini-
mizing its ability to do harm to our capital markets. 
A. SNAPSHOT OF STATE ACTIONS & INVESTIGATIONS 
The securities-related state regulatory matters disclosed in 
the dataset share a few notable common characteristics. First, 
states tended to target out-of-state defendants. In 68% of the 
ninety disclosed state matters that could be attributed to par-
ticular states, states targeted firms that were neither head-
quartered nor incorporated within the enforcing state.158
Second, the disclosed state matters were almost always ac-
companied by a related enforcement action by another securi-
ties law enforcer. Companies that disclosed being targeted by a 
state securities regulator also disclosed litigation at the hands 
of another securities law enforcer with respect to the same or 
related misconduct 93% of the time, reporting a related federal 
regulatory action or investigation 91% of the time, and related 
private litigation 67% of the time.
  
159
Finally, state regulators overwhelmingly targeted firms in 
the financial sector and focused on industry-wide scandals ra-
ther than one-off frauds. A full “93% of the targeted firms hail 
from the financial sector.”
  
160 And the vast majority of the 102 
disclosed state matters (85%) related to four highly publicized 
industry-wide scandals, each scandal at a slightly different 
stage of its life cycle in the time period examined: (1) the mutu-
al fund industry scandal over market timing and late trading 
(46%); (2) the insurance industry scandal involving the use of 
non-traditional insurance products to manipulate financial re-
sults (17%); (3) the investment banking scandal over biased an-
alyst research and IPO allocation practices (9%); and (4) the 
mutual fund industry scandal over certain marketing practices, 
such as directed brokerage (8%).161
 
 158. Id. at 475 n.72. 
 An additional six actions 
 159. Id. at 473 (Table 9). 
 160. Id. at 473–74 & n.71. 
 161. Id. at 475 (Figure 1). For background on these scandals, see id. at 463 
nn.43–44, 473 n.68 & 474 n.70. It is interesting that, with the exception of the 
finite insurance matters, these are not typical “fraud-on-the-market” cases in-
volving operating companies disseminating false information to the market-
place in an effort to inflate their stock prices. The finite insurance scandal in-
volved operating companies allegedly misrepresenting their financial results, 
with the help of the insurance industry. But the mutual fund and biased re-
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(6%) related to one of the two mutual fund industry scandals 
just mentioned, but ambiguity in the disclosures made it im-
possible to determine which. The remaining 15% of the dis-
closed securities-related state regulatory matters involved oth-
er types of misconduct. This subset also involved a large degree 
of overlap with federal regulatory efforts (73%), but less so than 
the group of securities-related state regulatory matters overall 
(91%). 
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING  
In this section, the plausibility of each of the four hypothe-
ses about state enforcement behavior introduced in Part II.D is 
evaluated in light of the data. As with any empirical endeavor, 
caution is necessary when interpreting results. Perhaps the 
biggest limitation of this dataset is that it covers only disclo-
sures made in the studied companies’ fiscal year 2004, 2005 
and 2006 Form 10-Ks.162
1. Vacuum Filling 
 Enforcement patterns may change 
with the times, and it would therefore be preferable to have da-
ta spanning a much longer period. That said, this dataset offers 
more insight into state securities enforcement behavior than 
has previously been available.  
If federal authorities did in fact under-deter securities 
fraud by public companies, the costs would be felt more acutely 
in some states than others. This leads to the hypothesis 
that the more sensitive a state’s citizenry is to the health of the 
national capital markets, the more likely that state’s govern-
ment will take meaningful steps to fill voids created by federal 
under-enforcement. While such activity may be costly, and may 
create positive externalities, the state may capture enough of 
 
search scandals involved financial service providers allegedly defrauding their 
clients, and thus may seem as much about “consumer protection” as “investor 
protection.” But it would be incorrect to view these scandals as simply involv-
ing localized consumer abuses. Both mutual fund scandals challenged the ac-
curacy or completeness of disclosures in nationally disseminated mutual fund 
prospectuses; the biased research scandal challenged the accuracy of national-
ly disseminated research reports and recommendations. It should be noted 
that when financial service providers engage in deceptive practices toward cli-
ents on such a scale, it—like fraud-on-the-market by operating companies—
can work to discourage investors from participating in the capital markets and 
thus increase the cost of capital. Overly-aggressive enforcement against such 
firms can likewise raise the cost of capital, by making financial services more 
expensive and thus discouraging participation in the capital markets. 
 162. For a discussion of the dataset’s other limitations, see id. at 455–57. 
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the deterrence benefits to make it worthwhile. This hypothesis 
is consistent with academic arguments that NSMIA’s fraud 
carve-out may be socially valuable because the prospect of state 
enforcement serves as an important check on SEC capture and 
complacency. 
Quantitative testing of this hypothesis did not produce 
support. A regression was run to test the relationship between 
various independent variables and a state’s level of disclosed 
enforcement activity.163 These included independent variables 
relevant to this hypothesis. For example, population was one of 
the independent variables, and states with larger populations 
likely internalize a bigger portion of the harm caused by public 
companies’ securities-related misconduct, and thus might be 
expected to invest more in deterring it. The number of public 
companies headquartered in the state, and the percentage of 
state GDP attributable to the financial sector, were also used 
as independent variables. The number of public companies 
headquartered in a state might bear a positive relationship to 
the level of a state’s enforcement activity, if being home to pub-
lic companies makes a state more sensitive to the cost of capi-
tal, and if greater enforcement helps reduce the cost of capital 
(by, for example, increasing investors’ confidence in company 
disclosures). Similarly, the dependence of a state’s economy on 
the financial sector might bear a positive relationship to the 
level of a state’s enforcement activity, if greater enforcement 
benefits the financial sector (by, for example, increasing confi-
dence in the markets and hence the number of fee-generating 
financial transactions).164
But quantitative testing of this hypothesis is problematic. 
As discussed below in connection with the Rent Seeking Hy-
pothesis, the same independent variables might bear an inverse 
 The results of the regression showed 
no statistically significant relationship between any of these 
variables and the number of investigations and actions a state 
brought. 
 
 163. “We selected a negative binomial model because our variable of inter-
est [wa]s over-dispersed count data, specifically the number of state actions 
and investigations brought by each state.” See id. at 471 & n.55. For full re-
gression results, see id. at 493 (Table A.12).  
 164. It is also possible that the number of public companies headquartered 
in the state, and the percentage of state GDP attributable to the financial sec-
tor, might bear a negative relationship to enforcement activity if they increase 
the likelihood that a state is “captured” by managerial interests who prefer lax 
enforcement, or if greater enforcement is not in fact beneficial in the ways as-
sumed above. 
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relationship with the number of enforcement actions brought, if 
states bring actions for opportunistic rather than vacuum-
filling purposes—just as states that are particularly sensitive 
to the health of the capital markets are more likely to bring 
“good” enforcement actions, states that are particularly insensi-
tive to the health of the capital markets are more likely to bring 
“bad” ones. If both the Vacuum Filing and Rent Seeking Hy-
potheses are true (and there is no reason why they cannot be), 
the behavior of these two groups of states might cancel out any 
explanatory significance of variables tied to a state’s sensitivity 
to the health of the capital markets. 
A qualitative analysis of the data may therefore be more il-
luminating. I undertook such an analysis, and found some ten-
tative support for the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis—though it 
clearly cannot explain all of the disclosed enforcement actions. 
The data revealed New York to have the most active state secu-
rities enforcer vis-à-vis the companies in the dataset by a wide 
margin. As explained below, New York’s unique sensitivity to 
the national capital markets, and the nature of the actions and 
investigations it brought against the companies in the dataset, 
render its behavior arguably consistent with the Vacuum Fill-
ing Hypothesis. Besides New York, only three other states were 
identified as having brought more than four actions or investi-
gations against the companies in the dataset: West Virginia 
(14), Connecticut (10), and Massachusetts (8).165
a. New York 
 Like New 
York, both Connecticut and Massachusetts might be viewed as 
having an outsized interest in the health of the national capital 
markets relative to most states. However, their enforcement ac-
tivity does not lend significant support to the Vacuum Filling 
Hypothesis, given that the actions and investigations they 
brought did not fill significant enforcement gaps. West Virgin-
ia’s activity is clearly inconsistent with this hypothesis.  
Perhaps more so than any other state, New York’s economy 
is dependent on healthy, active and liquid U.S. capital markets. 
New York is, after all, the “financial capital of the world.”166
 
 165. Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 468 (Table 6). 
 Ac-
cording to a 2007 McKinsey report commissioned by New York 
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Chuck 
 166. See, e.g., Kathryn Cooper, New York Ousts London as World Financial 
Capital, SUNDAY TIMES (UK) (Nov. 11, 2012), available at http://www 
.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Finance/article1161834.ece. 
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Schumer, “the financial services sector is even more critical to 
the New York economy than to the country as a whole”—
representing “approximately 15% of real gross product for both 
New York City and New York State” (as compared to 8% of na-
tional GDP) and accounting for “approximately 36% of [New 
York] City’s business income tax revenues” and “1 in every 9 
private sector jobs” (as compared to one in nineteen national-
ly).167 New York also claims the second highest number of prin-
cipal executive offices of the public companies in the dataset.168
Moreover, most of the enforcement actions and investiga-
tions that New York brought against the companies in the da-
taset involved widespread financial sector abuses that the SEC 
had not (at least prior to New York’s efforts) taken aggressive 
action to remedy—most notably in this time period the practice 
of mutual fund advisers to allow favored investors to engage in 
market timing and late trading in managed funds.
 
Thus, if any state should be concerned about SEC enforcement 
failures that dampen investor confidence in our capital mar-
kets, one might expect it to be New York.  
169 After the 
mutual fund scandal first broke, the Wall Street Journal re-
ported that the SEC was “scrambling to keep up” with the New 
York Attorney General (NYAG), just as it had after the NYAG 
broke the scandal over biased analyst research in 2002.170 A re-
port prepared by the SEC’s Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) corroborates this, explaining how the SEC chose to follow 
up on complaints about permitted market timing in Putnam 
mutual funds only after Spitzer released a public complaint 
against Canary Capital accusing multiple funds of allowing 
market timing; an SEC official testified that after the Canary 
Complaint became public, “the SEC’s interest in market-timing 
issues was heightened.”171
 
 167. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW 
YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 35–36 (2007), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. 
 
 168. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 482 (Table A.3). 
 169. Nineteen of New York’s disclosed actions and investigations involved 
market timing allegations; four involved finite insurance; two involved biased 
analyst research; one involved mutual fund marketing issues; one involved 
either market timing or mutual fund marketing issues (the author could not 
tell which); and four involved other allegations.  
 170. Tom Lauricella, For Staid Mutual-Fund Industry, Growing Probe Sig-
nals Shake-Up, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at A1. 
 171. See SEC Office of Inspector General, Memorandum of Inquiry PI No. 
09-38, at 6 (Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/pi 
-09-38.pdf. A former Putnam employee named Peter Scannell had complained 
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To be sure, the SEC’s failure to root out market timing and 
late trading in the mutual fund industry prior to the NYAG’s 
efforts need not be viewed as an indication of its capture by 
those it regulates. It had taken some efforts to combat arbi-
trage trading in mutual funds prior to Spitzer’s efforts,172 just 
as it had been considering reforms to deal with biased analyst 
research before Spitzer took an interest in that topic.173 Moreo-
ver, New York’s enforcement efforts could be criticized as not 
advancing the goal of optimal deterrence so much as the politi-
cal ambition of Eliot Spitzer, a theory explored below in connec-
tion with the Political Entrepreneur Hypothesis.174
 
to the SEC about market timing in Putnam funds in April of 2003, but the 
SEC did not take action against the company until the filing of Eliot Spitzer’s 
complaint against Canary in September 2003 put market timing in the head-
lines. At approximately the same time that the SEC opened an investigation, 
Scannell took his complaint to the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, which initiated its own investigation. Scannell later went to 
the OIG, claiming the SEC had improperly acted to protect Putnam, a claim 
the OIG rejected. See generally id. 
 But New 
York’s activity is at least arguably consistent with the Vacuum 
Filling Hypothesis—a state with a heightened sensitivity to the 
capital markets stepping up to fill voids left by federal under-
enforcement. 
 172. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-05-313, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: LESSONS CAN BE 
LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER 
STAGE 4 (April 2005) (“SEC staff made good faith efforts to control the known 
risks associated with market timing through the regulatory process.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 
33-8119, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46301, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,510 (proposed 
Aug. 8, 2002) (reporting on the SEC’s efforts in this regard beginning in 1999). 
 174. See infra Part IV.B.4. The SEC, for one, was openly critical of Spitzer’s 
decision to make mutual fund advisors reduce management fees as part of 
their market timing settlements with the NYAG. The SEC had chosen not to 
make fee reductions a condition of the market timing settlements it entered, 
explaining that it saw “no legitimate basis for the Commission to act as a 
‘rate-setter’ and determine how much mutual fund customers should pay for 
the services they receive in the future”—a decision “better left to informed 
consumers, independent and vigorous mutual fund boards, and the free mar-
ket.” Press Release, SEC, Alliance Capital Management Will Pay Record $250 
Million and Make Significant Governance and Compliance Reforms to Settle 
SEC Charges (Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-176.htm.; 
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction, LEGAL AFFAIRS, March/April 
2004, at 49 (observing that a cause of SEC passivity with respect to market 
timing “may have been the fear that harsh penalties and rhetorical condemna-
tions would produce an undesirable ‘run on the funds,’ leading to massive 
withdrawals from the mutual fund industry”). 
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b. Connecticut 
Connecticut has obvious ties to New York; indeed, a major-
ity of the state’s population is part of the New York City metro-
politan area.175 Connecticut also counts on the financial services 
sector for over 10% of its real gross product, something that is 
true for only six other states, according to the McKinsey re-
port.176 The financial services sector also provides one in every 
eight private sector jobs in Hartford, Connecticut’s capital 
city.177 Connecticut is also among the top ten states claiming 
the most principal executive offices of public companies in the 
dataset,178 and is home to many hedge funds.179
As the so-called “Insurance Capital of the World,” Connect-
icut also has a special interest in ensuring the integrity of the 
insurance corner of the financial sector in particular.
 It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that Connecticut has more of a stake in 
the health of our national capital markets than many states.  
180 It is 
thus notable that 60% of the securities-related enforcement ac-
tions and investigations Connecticut was disclosed to have 
brought against the companies in the dataset involved the in-
dustry-wide scandal over the alleged improper accounting of fi-
nite insurance products. Connecticut did not “break” this scan-
dal the way that New York broke the market timing scandal, 
however. Both the SEC and the NYAG began probes into the 
misuse of finite insurance products before Connecticut entered 
the fray,181
 
 175. James Orr & Giorgio Topa, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Challenges Facing 
the New York Metropolitan Area Economy, 12 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS 
AND FINANCE, 1 n.1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
research/current_issues/ci12-1.pdf. 
 and one or both of these regulators took parallel ac-
 176. The others are New York, Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 
167, at 35. 
 177. Id. at 36. 
 178. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 482 (Table A.3).  
 179. See Claude Schwab, The Top 5 U.S. Cities Seeking Hedge Fund Talent, 
INST. INVESTOR’S ALPHA (May 31, 2011), http://www 
.institutionalinvestorsalpha.com/article/2839531/The-Top-5-US-cities-seeking-
hedge-fund-talent.html (“After New York, Connecticut has the second largest 
number of funds managing $1 billion or more and ranks third in the world, 
after London, according to industry estimates.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Jamie Kageleiry, The Insurance Capital of the World, 
YANKEE (May 1990), available at http://new.yankeemagazine.com/article/ 
insurance-capital-world. 
 181. See Dean Starkman & Carrie Johnson, Loss of Coordination: Spitzer 
and Federal Officials Pursuing Insurance Probe Separately, WASH. POST, July 
19, 2005, at D1. 
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tion against four of the six companies in the dataset that Con-
necticut reportedly investigated regarding these products. It is 
possible that Connecticut’s enforcement activity was designed 
to supplement what it perceived to be an unduly weak en-
forcement response by these other regulators, something that 
would be consistent with the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis. But a 
review of Connecticut’s efforts does not recommend this as a 
very plausible interpretation, as the state rarely pursued mat-
ters past the investigative phase.182
 
 182. The two companies Connecticut targeted related to finite insurance 
which were not apparently targeted in a parallel SEC or NYAG investigation 
were MetLife, Inc. and Phoenix Companies, Inc. Connecticut’s efforts against 
these firms, as well as the other four it targeted in connection with finite in-
surance, are briefly described below. In addition to these six actions, Connecti-
cut brought two actions or investigations related to market timing: one related 
to mutual fund marketing practices, and one concerning other alleged miscon-
duct.  
 It is also possible that Con-
 MetLife, Inc. disclosed receiving a subpoena from the Connecticut Attor-
ney General requesting information regarding its participation in any finite 
reinsurance transactions, as well as receiving similar information requests 
from “other regulatory and governmental entities.” MetLife, Inc., Annual Re-
port 38 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2006). It does not appear that these investiga-
tions amounted to any formal prosecution against the firm. 
 Phoenix Companies, Inc. also disclosed receiving a subpoena from the 
Connecticut Attorney General’s Office as well as an inquiry from the Connecti-
cut Insurance Department requesting information regarding finite reinsur-
ance. See Phoenix Cos. Inc., Annual Report 22 (Form 10-K) (March 2, 2006). It 
does not appear that any further action was taken against the company.  
 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. disclosed that its Connecticut-based subsidiary 
General Reinsurance (General Re) received a subpoena from the Connecticut 
Attorney General related to the company’s sale of non-traditional insurance 
products. It does not appear that the Connecticut Attorney General took any 
further action against the company. General Re paid substantial fines to settle 
related charges filed by the SEC. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 
General Re Corporation for Role in AIG and Prudential Accounting Frauds 
(Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-10.htm. Berkshire 
also disclosed related investigations by the DOJ, NYAG, and various state in-
surance departments. See Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Annual Report 50 (Form 
10-K) (March 1, 2006). 
 Chubb Corporation disclosed reaching a joint settlement with the attorney 
generals of New York, Connecticut and Illinois related to a variety of issues, 
including finite reinsurance. See The Chubb Corp., Annual Report 37 (Form 
10-K) (Feb. 28, 2007). The settlement involved the payment of $17 million and 
certain business practices reforms. See Press Release, NYAG, Chubb Agrees to 
Forgo All Contingent Commissions (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
press-release/chubb-agrees-forgo-all-contingent-commissions. New York—not 
Connecticut—apparently led the investigative effort. See Press Release, Chubb 
Group of Insurance Companies, Chubb Settles with New York, Connecticut 
and Illinois AGs (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.chubb.com/corporate/chubb6132 
.html. Chubb also disclosed receiving subpoenas and requests for information 
from federal regulators, including the SEC and DOJ, relating to certain finite 
reinsurance products. See The Chubb Corp., Annual Report 15 (Form 10-K) 
(March 3, 2006). 
  
2013] STATE ENFORCEMENT 1397 
 
necticut conducted investigations to determine whether the 
federal government’s response was appropriately strong, and 
then dropped matters after determining that it was. 
Interestingly, Democrat Richard Blumenthal, Connecti-
cut’s elected Attorney General at the time, was involved in all 
of the actions and investigations Connecticut was disclosed to 
have brought related to finite insurance. By contrast, the 
State’s Republican-appointed Insurance Commissioner, Susan 
Cogswell, played a role in only one. The Hartford Courant re-
ported in late 2004 that Cogswell had been criticized for not 
playing a more proactive role in investigating scandals beset-
ting the insurance industry, and contrasted her understated 
approach to publicity with “the politically ambitious . . . Blu-
menthal, who court[s] the news media.”183 The Attorney Gen-
eral was also responsible for three of the four other securities-
related investigations or actions Connecticut brought against 
companies in the dataset, with Connecticut’s Republican-
appointed Banking Commissioner—the official with primary 
responsibility for enforcing the state’s securities laws184
 
 Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. disclosed receiving, as early 2003, 
subpoenas and requests for additional information relating to the SEC’s inves-
tigation of non-traditional insurance products. It also disclosed receiving “simi-
lar inquiries from regulators and other authorities in several states,” including 
Florida, Georgia and Connecticut. See Marsh & McLennan Cos. Inc., Annual 
Report 80 (Form 10-K) (March 1, 2006). The Connecticut Attorney General ul-
timately entered a settlement with a Marsh subsidiary, although the focus of 
that case was anticompetitive conduct rather than securities-related issues. 
See Press Release, Guy Carpenter, Guy Carpenter Settles Connecticut Attor-
ney General’s Lawsuit (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.guycarp.com/ 
portal/extranet/press/PDF/2011/110131_GuyCarpenter_ConnecticutAG.pdf? 
vid=1 
—
bringing only one. These facts do not speak to whether Con-
 Prudential Financial, Inc. disclosed that in April 2005 it voluntary under-
took a review of its accounting for reinsurance arrangements; subsequently, 
the company “received a formal request from the Connecticut Attorney Gen-
eral for information regarding its participation in reinsurance transactions 
generally and a formal request from the SEC for information regarding certain 
reinsurance contracts entered into with a single counterparty.” See Prudential 
Fin. Inc., Annual Report 160 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2006). The SEC brought 
related charges in 2008; Prudential settled them without paying a fine. See 
Prudential Fin. Inc., Annual Report 230 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2009). It does 
not appear that the Connecticut Attorney General pursued a case against the 
firm. 
 183. Diane Levick, Insurance Commissioner Answers Her Critics: Some 
Want Cogswell to Play a More Proactive Role in Industry Scandals, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Nov. 28, 2004, http://articles.courant.com/2004-11-28/news/ 
0411280651_1_insurance-commissioners-insurance-industry-connecticut-
insurance.  
 184. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36b-4(d) (2011).  
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necticut’s actions and investigations played an important vacu-
um-filling role. They do, however, suggest that the Political En-
trepreneur Hypothesis may provide at least a complementary 
explanation of Connecticut’s behavior.  
c. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts, which shares borders with both New York 
and Connecticut, is one of the seven states that the McKinsey 
report indicates owe more than 10% of their real gross product 
to the financial services sector.185 That sector also accounts for 
one in every fourteen private sector jobs in Boston, its capital 
and largest city.186 Out of the fifty states, it claims the eleventh 
most principal executive offices of the public companies in the 
dataset.187
Massachusetts may also have a particular interest in the 
mutual fund industry. The state is considered the historic 
birthplace of the modern mutual fund,
 Thus, it too may have an outsized interest in the 
health of our national capital markets, relative to many other 
states.  
188 and mutual funds are 
commonly organized as Massachusetts business trusts today.189 
Just as Connecticut focused its efforts on securities offenses 
implicating the insurance industry,190 Massachusetts focused 
its efforts on abuses in the mutual fund industry—each compa-
ny it targeted reported being investigated by the state in con-
nection with market timing. This might be seen as a state with 
a special interest taking steps to fill enforcement gaps, con-
sistent with the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis. But given the con-
siderable enforcement efforts taken to remedy these abuses by 
both New York and (in its wake) the SEC,191
 
 185. BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 167, at 35. 
 there is reason to 
be skeptical of this view. Indeed, every company that disclosed 
being targeted by Massachusetts also disclosed being targeted 
by one or both of these other enforcers, and each reached sub-
 186. Id. at 36. 
 187. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 482. 
 188. See James E. McWhinney, A Brief History of the Mutual Fund, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
mutualfund/05/MFhistory.asp#axzz21eQR0EQu. 
 189. Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A 
Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
225, 280 n.245 (2007). 
 190. See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 191. See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 
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stantial settlements with the SEC.192 In one case, however, 
Massachusetts’s Secretary of State William Galvin did indicate 
his dissatisfaction with the company’s SEC settlement, which 
permitted the defendant to neither admit nor deny the allega-
tions.193
 
 192. The data revealed five companies targeted by Massachusetts for al-
leged market timing abuses (some of these companies also disclosed being in-
vestigated by Massachusetts regarding other topics, such as mutual fund 
marketing practices). The outcome of these actions is briefly described below: 
 Unlike the SEC, Galvin insisted that the company ad-
mit to factual allegations, going so far as to force it to file an 
 Prudential Financial reached a $600 million joint settlement with federal 
regulators and Massachusetts, $5 million of which was paid to Massachusetts. 
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prudential Financial Subsidiary 
Agrees to Pay $600,000,000 in Largest Resolution of Market Timing Case 
(Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Prudential/Prudential 
.pdf. 
 Franklin Resources, Inc. reached a $50 million settlement with the SEC. 
See Franklin Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,271, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 26,523 (Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/admin/ia-2271.htm (Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-
and-Desist Proceedings). It reached a separate $5 million settlement with 
Massachusetts. Franklin Settles with Massachusetts, Again, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 2004, at C5. 
 Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. reached a $55 million settlement 
with the SEC and a simultaneous $55 million settlement with Massachusetts, 
on behalf of its Boston-headquartered subsidiary Putnam Investments. See 
Jonathan Fuerbringer, Putnam Settles S.E.C. Complaint on Market Timing for 
$110 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at C1. 
 A.G. Edwards reported that in February 2005 “Massachusetts filed . . . an 
administrative complaint against Edwards concerning certain mutual fund 
transactions in Edwards’ Boston-Back Bay office.” A.G. Edwards Inc., Annual 
Report 9 (Form 10-K) (May 11, 2006). It is unclear how this litigation was re-
solved. The SEC also brought market timing claims against A.G. Edwards, 
which the company ultimately settled in 2007. See Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Charges A.G. Edwards with Failing to Supervise Brokers who Engaged in Ille-
gal Market Timing: A.G. Edwards Agrees to Pay $3.86 Million to Settle 
Charges; SEC Also Charges Two Brokers and Two Branch Managers with 
Misconduct (May 2, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-84.htm. 
 Morgan Stanley reported receiving “subpoenas and requests for infor-
mation from various regulatory and governmental agencies, including the At-
torney General of the State of New York, the SEC, NASD, the Massachusetts 
Securities Division, the U.S. Attorney’s Office of Massachusetts and the Office 
of the State Auditor and the Attorney General of West Virginia in connection 
with industry-wide investigations of broker-dealers and mutual fund complex-
es relating to possible late trading and market timing of mutual funds.” Mor-
gan Stanley, Annual Report 18 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2005). It is not clear 
whether Massachusetts pursued any formal action against the company. The 
company did ultimately agree to pay $17 million to the SEC in settlement of 
charges that it allowed hedge fund clients to deceptively market-time certain 
mutual funds. See Morgan Stanley, Exchange Act Release No. 56,980, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 28,078 (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/admin/2007/34-56980.pdf (Order Instituting Administrative and 
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings). 
 193. See Franklin Settles with Massachusetts, Again, supra note 192.  
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amendment to its SEC settlement documents.194 Thus, it is pos-
sible that Massachusetts was playing a vacuum-filling role of 
sorts by pushing for more meaningful sanctions than federal 
regulators were demanding.195 As with New York and Connecti-
cut, political ambition may also play an explanatory role—
Galvin was rumored to be considering a gubernatorial bid dur-
ing this time frame.196
d. West Virginia 
  
Whereas an argument can be made that the enforcement 
activity of New York (and, less convincingly, Connecticut and 
Massachusetts) is consistent with the Vacuum Filling Hypothe-
sis, giving credence to the claim that NSMIA’s fraud carve-out 
serves a socially useful function, the same simply cannot be 
said for West Virginia’s activity—which is second in volume on-
ly to New York’s. First of all, West Virginia’s economy has no 
special dependence on the financial sector. To the contrary, it 
owes far less of its real gross product to the financial sector 
than the nation overall.197
 
 194. See id.; Todd Wallack, Franklin Settles for $50 Million, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 3, 2004, at C1 (reporting that the Secretary said, “[w]e tend to be among 
the last to settle, because we insist on some admission of wrongdoing”). 
 It also claims the principal executive 
offices of only one of the companies in the dataset. Second, the 
actions that it brought filled no vacuums—each was clearly a 
 195. The suggestion that Galvin was being tougher than Eliot Spitzer by 
forcing admissions of wrongdoing allegedly led Spitzer to declare “screw Bill 
Galvin!” at a conference held by the Society of American Business Editors and 
Writers in mid-2005. See Cosmo Macero, Jr., Between Bouts, Spitzer Goes After 
Galvin, BOSTON HERALD, May 4, 2005, at 30. The SEC’s routine use of settle-
ments allowing no admission of wrongdoing has come under increased scruti-
ny by courts in recent years, causing the SEC to make some minor modifica-
tions to its policy. See Andrew Ackerman, SEC Modifies “Confirm nor Deny”, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7–8, 2012, at B14. The policy issue is not clear cut, as admis-
sions may be used against defendants in follow-on private litigation, and thus 
may frustrate the SEC’s attempts to settle cases. 
 196. John Laidler, Potential Gubernatorial Candidates Begin Wooing Area 
Voters: Democrats Eager to Retake Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2005, at 4. 
 197. For instance, in 2011 West Virginia ranked 45th in the nation for 
GDP derived from finance and insurance. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: GDP & PERSONAL IN-
COME (2011), available at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/drilldown.cfm?reqid= 
70&stepnum=11&AreaTypeKeyGdp=0&GeoFipsGdp=XX&ClassKeyGdp=NAI
CS&ComponentKey=200&IndustryKey=150&YearGdp=2011&YearGdpBegin
=-1&YearGdpEnd=-1&UnitOfMeasureKeyGdp=Levels&RankKeyGdp= 
1&Drill=1&nRange=5. To obtain data on state GDP, see U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov (last visited Mar. 12, 
2012). 
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“piggyback” or “me, too” action filed in the wake of enforcement 
activity by other regulators. West Virginia’s actions are dis-
cussed in more detail below, in Part IV.B.2.  
e. Notable Absences 
In evaluating the strength of the Vacuum Filling Hypothe-
sis, it is also important to pay attention to what the data does 
not reveal. It does not reveal any enforcement activity by Dela-
ware, despite the fact that Delaware is the state of incorpora-
tion of 58% of the companies in the dataset and owes 36% of its 
gross domestic product to the financial sector.198 Nor does it re-
veal any enforcement activity by Texas, notwithstanding that 
more companies in the dataset are headquartered in Texas 
than any other state.199 California is the most populous state 
and headquarters to 10% of the companies in the dataset, yet it 
was identified as having brought only one enforcement ac-
tion.200
These facts, while notable, do not necessarily undermine 
the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis. It may be that the efforts of a 
single state are all that is needed to correct for federal under-
enforcement; if that is the case, New York’s activity in this time 
frame may have relieved pressure on these other states to take 
action. It may also be the case that these states did not take ac-
tion because they did not perceive the SEC to be under-
enforcing, or because they lacked resources. It is also possible 
that these states’ enforcement incentives were compromised—
for example, Delaware is frequently accused of being captured 
 
 
 198. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 479 (Table A.1). For a discus-
sion of the possible reasons for Delaware’s dominance in the “race” for corpo-
rate charters, see A.C. Pritchard, London as Delaware?, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 
473, 476–83 (2009). 
 199. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 483 (Table A.3). 
 200. California’s efforts were at least slightly stronger than the dataset 
would suggest, however. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer took an ag-
gressive (and controversial) stance in this time period on mutual fund market-
ing practices. The one action by California included in the dataset involved a 
case he brought against Franklin Resources related to this topic. See, e.g., Tom 
Lauricella & Arden Dale, Franklin Resources Nears Settlement, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 15, 2004, at C15. Lockyer also asserted similar allegations against other 
companies that were not in the dataset. See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, California 
Tackles Disclosure Issues at Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2004, at C1 
(noting that Lockyer’s settlement with a mutual-fund company “essentially 
created a new requirement that fund companies disclose how much they pay 
brokerage firms to hawk their funds and which firms get the money”). 
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by corporate managers who favor policies that are not in the 
best interest of investors or the capital markets more broadly.201
2. Rent Seeking 
 
Whereas the Vacuum Filling Hypothesis casts NSMIA’s 
fraud carve-out in a positive light, the Rent Seeking Hypothesis 
focuses on its negative potential. Consistent with the Vacuum 
Filling Hypothesis, state-led efforts can produce positive exter-
nalities when they fill enforcement gaps left by the SEC. But 
state-led efforts can also produce negative externalities when 
they target public firms that have already been disciplined by 
other authorities. Nothing formally prevents a state regulator 
from free-riding on the investigative efforts of the SEC, the pri-
vate bar, or other state regulators by filing a follow-on suit to 
recover a quick fine for the state fisc, while adding little to the 
deterrence mix. Such activity creates deadweight social costs, 
but those costs are borne by the entire nation while the state 
alone enjoys the revenue from the fine.202 One would hope that 
a general concern for the national welfare on the part of state 
regulators keeps this sort of strategic activity to a minimum.203
Evaluating this hypothesis is difficult, as it requires judg-
ment about the value particular enforcement actions add to the 
nation’s quest for optimal deterrence. It is hard to say, for ex-
ample, whether the Connecticut and Massachusetts actions 
and investigations discussed above—which largely piled on the 
enforcement efforts of the NYAG and SEC—were beneficial or 
not. They may have made up for insufficiently vigorous en-
forcement by the other regulators who pursued the same com-
panies. Even if they did not add value, however, it is unlikely 
that they were part of a systematic effort by Connecticut and 
Massachusetts to profit on the backs of the insurance and mu-
 
To the extent it does occur, I predict that the responsible states 
would be particularly insensitive to the health of the national 
capital markets and to the interests of public companies more 
broadly—thus internalizing little of the harm their actions 
would produce.  
 
 201. See Cary, supra note 67, at 668–70. 
 202. For example, it might make it more difficult for federal regulators to 
negotiate settlements with offending firms, or lead public companies to invest 
more than is socially optimal in fraud deterrence. 
 203. The background threat of federal preemption might also operate to 
suppress this behavior. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also 
Mathiesen, supra note 114. 
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tual fund industries, given the close ties the states have to 
those industries. Instead, they likely reflected attempts by in-
dividual regulators to appear involved in remedying abuses in 
those industries. I feel quite confident, however, suggesting 
that West Virginia’s actions were not in the national interest.  
West Virginia brought fourteen actions against twelve 
companies in the dataset; six involved allegations related to bi-
ased analyst research and eight involved market timing allega-
tions. The research cases were filed by the West Virginia At-
torney General (WVAG) after each of the targeted companies 
had negotiated a global research settlement with representa-
tives from the SEC, NASD, NYSE and all fifty states—
including West Virginia’s Auditor, who is in charge of enforcing 
the state’s securities laws.204 The negotiated global settlement 
provided for wide-ranging injunctive relief and an unprece-
dented payment of $1.4 billion.205 The WVAG nevertheless 
brought fresh claims against the settling defendants—based on 
allegations apparently cut and pasted from the defendant 
firms’ settlement documents—under the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA).206 The WVAG con-
tended that the defendants violated that statute each time they 
“acted improperly in connection with the underwriting, market-
ing, allocation and pricing of securities or in the issuance or 
publication of research reports, ratings or opinions that were 
based on the conflict of interest between research and invest-
ment banking”—with violations “believed to be in the hundreds 
of thousands” with “each punishable by a fine of $5,000.”207
While challenges to legitimacy of these claims were wind-
ing their way through the West Virginia courts, the WVAG 
brought the market timing actions—again against a group of 
defendants that had already negotiated substantial settlements 
with the SEC and other regulators, again pursuant to the 
WVCCPA, again with allegations apparently cut and pasted 
from the defendant firms’ settlement documents with other 
  
 
 204. Brief of Petitioners at 1–2, State ex rel. McGraw, Jr. v. Bear, Stearns 
& Co., 618 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va. 2005) (No. 32515) (on file with author). 
 205. See Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., SEC, NY Attorney General, 
NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to 
Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press 
-release/sec-ny-attorney-general-nasd-nasaa-nyse-and-state-regulators-
announce-historic (describing the settlement’s terms). 
 206. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 204, at 2. 
 207. Id. at 3. 
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regulators, and again seeking breathtaking fines.208 Both sets of 
actions were dismissed after the West Virginia Supreme Court 
held that the WVCCPA does not apply to transactions involving 
securities.209 The market timing cases, however, were then re-
asserted by the West Virginia Auditor under the West Virginia 
Securities Act—this time with a prayer that a $10,000 fine be 
imposed for each and every mutual fund prospectus the de-
fendants sent into the state that failed to disclose the alleged 
abuses.210
It does not appear that West Virginia’s actions had any re-
deeming social value. The misconduct they targeted had al-
ready been uncovered and aggressively pursued by other regu-
lators by the time they were filed.
 
211 West Virginia authorities 
apparently did no significant independent investigative work, 
instead simply cutting and pasting passages from the defend-
ants’ publicly available SEC settlement documents into their 
complaints. The state’s enforcement activity thus appears to 
have been nothing more than an opportunistic attempt to ex-
propriate wealth from the targeted firms’ public shareholders—
a strategy NSMIA’s fraud carve-out seemingly permits.212
But a nagging question remains: Why don’t more states 
engage in this sort of strategic behavior? West Virginia is not 
the only state with an understated interest in the health of our 
national capital markets. This strategy could be profitable for 
citizens in other states, as well. Yet there is no evidence of its 
broader use in the data. A closer look at the cases West Virgin-
ia brought suggests an answer to this puzzle. Every disclosed 
regulatory action brought by West Virginia against the compa-
nies in the dataset involved the use of private plaintiffs’ attor-
neys as co-counsel to the state.
 This 
sort of behavior increases the cost of being a public company to 
no good end. But, as noted above, West Virginia is not particu-
larly sensitive to these costs. Thus, West Virginia’s activity is 
arguably consistent with the Rent Seeking Hypothesis.  
213
 
 208. See Tamiko Toland, Janus, W.Va. at War over Timing, Late-Trading 
Razz, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, May 23, 2005, at 1. 
 A widely reported practice has 
 209. See State ex rel. McGraw, Jr. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 618 S.E.2d 582, 
587 (W. Va. 2005). 
 210. See, e.g., Summary Order, In re Janus Capital Grp. Inc., Before the 
Securities Commissioner (W. Va. Aug. 30, 2005) (No. 05-1320). 
 211. See, e.g., Toland, supra note 208 (noting that the SEC had already 
pursued action against the companies that West Virginia targeted). 
 212. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2006).  
 213. Anthony Majestro of Powell & Majestro, PLLC served as a “special 
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developed in West Virginia whereby its Attorney General, Dar-
rell McGraw, routinely doles out lucrative state litigation to 
private attorneys on a contingency fee-like basis.214 The data 
suggest that the West Virginia Auditor has gotten into the 
game as well. Some charge that McGraw’s use of private law-
yers to pursue state litigation is designed to reward his political 
supporters.215
Although it is impossible to know the WVAG’s motives, my 
research has produced facts that are consistent with this alle-
gation. According to the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics (the “Institute”), lawyers and lobbyists as a group were 
the single largest contributor to the 2004 reelection campaigns 
of both the WVAG and the West Virginia Auditor.
  
216 Moreover, 
a search of the Institute’s records revealed that partners at 
each of the six law firms that served as co-counsel to the state 
in the WVAG’s research cases contributed in that year to the 
WVAG’s own campaign and/or to the campaign his brother ran 
for reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court.217
 
assistant attorney general” in the market timing cases. See, e.g., Response to 
Petition for Appeal, Alliance Capital v. III (W. Va. June 26, 2006) (Appeal No. 
06-064) (on file with author) (listing Majestro as counsel for the state). The fol-
lowing private attorneys were listed as counsel for the state in the research 
cases: Marvin W. Masters of Masters & Taylor, LC; Barry Hill and Teresa 
Clark Toriseva of Hill, Toriseva & Williams, PLLC; Rudolph L. DiTrapano, 
Joshua I. Barrett and Sean P. McGinley of DiTrapano, Barrett & DiPiero, 
PLLC; James Peterson and R. Edison Hill of Hill Peterson Carper Bee 
Deitzler, PLLC; Sol H. Weiss and Joel D. Feldman of Anapol Schwartz Weiss 
Cohan Feldman Smalley PC; and Chris Placitella, Lynne M. Kizis, and Jen-
nifer Sarnelli of Wilentz Goldman & Spitzer. See Brief of Petitioners, supra 
note 
 It also re-
204 (certificate of service). 
 214. See, e.g., AGs Gone Wild, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007, at A24; McGraw 
Has Taken Outside Counsel Idea to New Heights, W. VA. REC., August 1, 2008; 
HANS BADER, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE NATION’S TOP TEN WORST 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 15–17 (Jan. 24, 2007), http://cei.org/pdf/5719.pdf. 
 215. See, e.g., W. VA. CITIZENS AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
FLAUNTING LAWS YOU ARE CHARGED TO PROTECT: A CRITICAL LOOK AT FOUR-
TEEN YEARS IN THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL DARRELL MCGRAW 6–7 
(June 2007), available at http://www.wvrecord.com/content/img/f196361/ 
CALAreport.pdf. 
 216. Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Table 2: Top 15 Industries, 
FOLLOW THE MONEY (last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.followthemoney 
.org/database/StateGlance/candidate.phtml?c=66200 (candidate summary for 
Glen B. Gainer III) and http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ 
candidate.phtml?c=66280 (candidate summary for Darrell McGraw). 
 217. See generally Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Candidates, FOL-
LOW THE MONEY (last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.followthemoney.org/ 
database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=WV&y=2004 (providing cam-
paign contribution data for West Virginia political candidates). The same is 
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vealed that the private attorney hired in the market timing 
cases contributed to the 2004 campaigns of the WVAG, his 
brother, and the West Virginia Auditor.218
3. Cooperation 
 Thus, I view West 
Virginia’s activity as consistent with both the Rent Seeking 
Hypothesis and, perhaps even more so, the Political Entrepre-
neur Hypothesis. 
Unlike the first two hypotheses, the third hypothesis casts 
aspersions on neither the SEC nor the states. Instead, it views 
their relationship as potentially symbiotic and cooperative, pos-
iting that state securities regulators may take action against 
public companies when they are better positioned to do so than 
the federal government, thus efficiently sharing the enforce-
ment burden. If the states and federal government were acting 
cooperatively, one would not expect to see them targeting the 
same firms for the same misconduct. Instead, one would expect 
only one regulator to take the enforcement lead. One would also 
expect states to target firms that they have some special con-
nection with, or to focus on misconduct that bears some special 
relationship to the state, as these factors would suggest that 
the state may enjoy an enforcement advantage relative to fed-
eral regulators.  
The vast majority of the state investigations and actions 
disclosed by the companies in the dataset do not appear to sup-
port the Cooperation Hypothesis. This is because 91% involved 
overlapping investigations by the federal government (93 out of 
102). Rather than cooperation, many of these cases involved 
open hostility between state and federal regulators—most no-
tably between the NYAG and the SEC.219 Moreover, only 32% of 
the ninety disclosed state actions and investigations that were 
attributable to particular states were brought against compa-
nies incorporated or headquartered in the enforcing state.220
While these facts suggest that the Cooperation Hypothesis 
may not have significant explanatory power, a more sympathet-
ic reading of the data is possible. First, the nine actions that 
  
 
true of all but one (Jennifer Sarnelli) of the individual attorneys identified in 
footnote 213 as representing the state. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See, e.g., Tom Lauricella et al., Mutual Funds Face Overhaul as 
Spitzer and SEC Fight for Turf, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2003, at A1; Dean 
Starkman & Carrie Johnson, Loss of Coordination: Spitzer and Federal Offi-
cials Pursuing Insurance Probe Separately, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at D1. 
 220. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 475–76. 
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did not involve an overlapping federal investigation lend the 
hypothesis limited support. These non-overlapping actions in-
clude some cases where state regulators may have enjoyed an 
enforcement advantage relative to federal enforcers due to their 
relationship to the company or the alleged misconduct. Moreo-
ver, I cannot rule out the possibility that there was an efficient 
division of labor between federal and state regulators in con-
nection with some of the overlapping investigations disclosed in 
the dataset. I do know that the state regulatory actions involv-
ing biased analyst research that were not brought by West Vir-
ginia involved a level of coordination between state and federal 
regulators,221
Moreover, a state may have a special connection to the firm 
or misconduct even if the target of the investigation is not 
headquartered or incorporated there. I therefore reexamined 
the data taking a more generous view of “special connection.” 
In addition to counting a state action as having a special con-
nection to the target if the target was incorporated or head-
quartered there, I counted it as “specially connected” if the mis-
conduct at issue bore some obvious relationship to the state. 
For example, I counted as connected suits by South Carolina 
and Georgia against A.G. Edwards, as they involved miscon-
duct in the firm’s Augusta branch, affecting residents in both 
those states. I also, for example, counted as connected New Jer-
sey’s market timing investigation into Merrill Lynch, as the 
misconduct involved a team in the firm’s New Jersey office. In 
addition, I counted as connected all of Connecticut’s actions and 
investigations related to finite insurance, and all of Massachu-
setts’ actions related to market timing and mutual fund mar-
keting issues, given the special relationship those states have 
to the insurance and mutual fund industries, respectively. Tak-
ing this more generous view of “special connection,” I would 
classify forty-nine of the ninety (54%) state actions and investi-
 although New York’s initial investigation into an-
alyst conflicts of interest was not a cooperative effort with the 
SEC. 
 
 221. Press Release, SEC, SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst 
Conflicts (April 25, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56.htm (an-
nouncing coordinated investigatory effort between the SEC, NASD, NYSE, 
NYAG and nine other states. Six of the nine state regulatory actions or inves-
tigations involving biased research allegations disclosed in the dataset were 
brought by West Virginia; the other three were brought by New York (2) and 
Utah (1)). 
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gations that were attributable to particular states as bearing 
some special connection to the enforcing state.222
4. Political Entrepreneurs 
  
The Political Entrepreneur Hypothesis is more broadly 
consistent with the data than any other single hypothesis I ex-
amined. The Political Entrepreneur Hypothesis focuses on the 
motivations of state enforcers, positing that they will utilize 
NSMIA’s fraud carve-out to pursue public companies if they 
stand to benefit personally by doing so. To be sure, state regu-
lators benefit (one hopes!) when they perform their job in a 
manner that promotes the welfare of their individual state and, 
perhaps, the nation more broadly. If that is what was meant by 
personal benefit, however, this hypothesis would add nothing to 
those already discussed. The focus instead is on distinctly per-
sonal benefits.  
I posit that elected regulators in particular stand to reap 
personal benefits from pursuing public companies for securi-
ties-related misconduct. Going after a public company can gar-
ner media attention that alerts citizens to the regulator’s en-
forcement efforts. This publicity can help elected regulators get 
reelected. It can also help propel them to higher office, some-
thing that elected regulators may care more about than their 
appointed counterparts if we assume the former are more polit-
ically ambitious. As the West Virginia actions demonstrate, 
under certain circumstances pursuing public companies can al-
so provide elected regulators with an opportunity to reward 
their political supporters. The foregoing logic leads to the pre-
diction that elected state regulators will utilize NMSIA’s fraud 
carve-out more often than appointed state regulators. 
The dataset provides compelling quantitative evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. Just 36% of states have an elected 
official in charge of securities enforcement.223 But these states 
were responsible for 80% of the disclosed matters attributable 
to particular states.224
 
 222. It is of course possible that other actions bore some special connection 
to the enforcing state that the author was unable to observe. 
 A regression, controlling for other varia-
bles that might influence a state’s level of enforcement intensi-
ty, revealed a statistically significant relationship between the 
elected status of the enforcer and the number of enforcement 
 223. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 148, at 457 n.28 (explaining how en-
forcers were classified). 
 224. Id. at 469 (Table 7). 
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actions brought. Specifically, states with elected enforcers 
brought actions at over four times the rate of states with ap-
pointed enforcers.225
A separate regression with similar controls was run, which 
tested for the effect of having an elected Democrat as the state’s 
primary securities enforcer.
  
226 The theory underlying this modi-
fication is that because the White House and SEC were con-
trolled by Republicans in the time frame examined, elected 
Democrats would have the most to gain by being active and 
demonstrating to voters that they are tougher on fraud than 
their political foils in Washington. The results of this second 
regression revealed that states with elected Democrats brought 
actions at nearly seven times the rate of other states, a result 
that was highly statistically significant.227
A qualitative look at the individuals disclosed by the da-
taset to be the most active enforcers—NYAG Eliot Spitzer, 
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Secretary 
of State William Galvin, and WVAG Darrell McGraw, all elect-
ed Democrats—adds further color to this hypothesis. The possi-
ble political motivation of WVAG McGraw—namely, to use en-
forcement actions against public companies as a means of 
rewarding political supporters—has already been discussed.
  
228 
It differs from the possible political motivation of the other 
three men—namely, to leverage publicity generated by their 
enforcement actions to aid in future political pursuits. Focusing 
on these three, it is interesting to note that not only was each 
an elected Democrat during a Republican presidential admin-
istration, but each man also served a state with a Republican 
governor and was reported during the time period to have gu-
bernatorial ambitions.229
 
 225. For full regression results, see id. at 493 (Table A.12). 
 Thus, the investigations and actions 
 226. See id. at 467 n.52 (explaining how party affiliation was determined). 
 227. Id. at 447–48, 472 (referring to results reported in the Appendix at 
Table A.13). 
 228. See supra Part IV.B.  
 229. Spitzer was the only one to realize his ambition, succeeding George 
Pataki as governor of New York in 2006—before a spectacular fall from grace 
in 2008. See Josh Getlin, Spitzer Reveals Plans to Run for N.Y. Governor, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004; see also Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, Spitzer, 
Linked to a Sex Ring as a Client, Gives an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 
2008, at A1. Blumenthal did not end up pursuing Connecticut’s governorship, 
instead holding on to his post as Connecticut Attorney General through 2010, 
when he successfully ran for U.S. Senate. See Connecticut: Malloy Elected 
First Dem Governor in Two Decades, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2010, http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2010-11-02-ct-full-election-
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these men brought did not merely offer a way to get their name 
mentioned in media reports, but also provided a way for them 
to position themselves in the eyes of voters as more aggressive 
on financial fraud than their Republican foils at both the feder-
al and state levels.230
It is important to recall that the Political Entrepreneur 
Hypothesis, unlike the other three hypotheses, does not speak 
directly to the social value of NSMIA’s fraud carve-out. En-
forcement activity undertaken for selfish purposes may, as in 
the West Virginia actions, be inimical to the public good. But a 
selfish desire for reelection or political advancement may also 
lead regulators to undertake actions that are in the nation’s 
best interest, as may arguably have been the case with respect 
to New York’s enforcement activity. 
  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 
The evidence discussed above is not definitive enough to 
answer whether concurrent state enforcement has done more 
good than harm in the securities context. But it does reveal 
that concurrent state enforcement has produced both social 
costs and benefits, even if those costs and benefits cannot be 
quantified and weighed against one another with precision. The 
question is therefore raised: Are reforms possible that would 
preserve state enforcement’s beneficial manifestations while 
minimizing its negative permutations, thus leading to social 
welfare gains? 
Based on the data, calls to eliminate NSMIA’s fraud carve-
out in its entirety are dubious, at least absent simultaneous re-
forms designed to improve the functioning of the SEC (or more 
convincing evidence of the SEC’s efficacy as a stand-alone en-
forcer). New York’s activity in particular suggests that state en-
forcement has operated to discipline a flagging SEC, and may 
do so again. But the data also suggest that the carve-out as it 
currently exists is too broad, for it indiscriminately grants any 
(and all) states authority to pursue public companies for securi-
ties-related misconduct, regardless of the state’s motivation—
 
results_N.htm. Galvin likewise chose not to run for governor, but retains his 
post as Massachusetts Secretary of State to this day. Seth Gitell, Waiting in 
the Wings, BOS. PHOENIX (Mar. 8, 2001), http://www.bostonphoenix.com/ 
boston/news_features/talking_politics/documents/00670492.htm. 
 230. See Macey, supra note 134, at 958 (observing that “Mr. Spitzer did not 
mount his initiative to regulate the securities markets (and along the way to 
politically embarrass the SEC and the administration) until his political party 
had lost control of the White House to the Republicans”).  
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thus permitting the type of rent-seeking behavior exemplified 
in the dataset by West Virginia.231
For example, policymakers might consider limiting the 
carve-out’s application to (1) New York and (2) to states that 
can demonstrate a special connection to the targeted company 
or the misconduct at issue. New York’s privileged treatment 
may be warranted due to its unique sensitivity to the health of 
the national capital markets, which makes it particularly well-
suited to play watchdog to the SEC. Singling out a state for ex-
emption from federal preemption would not be unprecedented: 
California has a similarly exalted status in the environmental 
arena.
 A narrower carve-out might 
help separate the wheat from the chaff.  
232 Requiring other states to meet the heightened juris-
dictional test would reduce the likelihood of purely opportunis-
tic enforcement, without restricting those states most likely to 
have appropriate enforcement incentives—and most likely to 
bring to the table the sort of local advantages typically associ-
ated with concurrent enforcement. While reducing the number 
of states with concurrent jurisdiction would make it marginally 
easier for special interests desiring under-enforcement to cap-
ture all enforcers, under this proposal, several states (though 
substantially less than fifty) would likely retain enforcement 
authority in any given case. Furthermore, the states most 
prone to capture by interest groups desiring over-enforcement 
would be appropriately disempowered.233
To be sure, preserving the ability of even this more limited 
set of states to police public companies for securities-related 
misconduct carries risks. Concerns have been voiced that politi-
cally ambitious state regulators sometimes go too far in their 
efforts to show up the SEC and can force companies into accept-
ing settlements with pernicious market-wide effects. This is a 
charge that many leveled against Eliot Spitzer during his ten-
 
 
 231. See also Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: 
Resolving Conflicts Between State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 317, 339 (2005) (asserting that “Oklahoma . . . dropped criminal 
securities fraud charges against WorldCom in return for a promise by the 
company to create 1600 jobs in the state over the next ten years”). 
 232. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 4, at 280 (explaining California’s spe-
cial authority to set motor vehicle emissions standards under the Air Quality 
Act of 1967). 
 233. Another possibility would be to extend the ban on federal agencies’ use 
of private counsel on a contingency-fee basis to state securities regulators ex-
ercising their preserved authority under NSMIA. See supra note 139. 
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ure as NYAG.234 Some scholars have, therefore, proposed legis-
lation that would authorize the SEC to invalidate an order or 
settlement reached by a state securities regulator that in the 
SEC’s view “unreasonably restrained competition, interfered 
with fair and orderly markets, impeded the national market 
system, or was otherwise contrary to the public interest or the 
protection of investors.”235
The fact that elected Democrats brought securities-related 
matters against the companies in the dataset at over seven 
times the rate of other enforcers
  
236 does seem to suggest that 
there is a political dimension to a state’s decision to pursue 
public companies for securities-related misconduct. And allow-
ing generalist state enforcers with political motivations to 
make decisions affecting national market structure is concern-
ing, as it undermines the public policy goals animating the 
SEC’s design as a politically insulated, independent agency. 
But the data simply cannot answer whether granting the SEC 
this type of veto authority would be beneficial or not. It is at 
least possible that a captured SEC would abuse the authori-
ty,237
 
 234. See, e.g., supra note 174 (discussing the rate-setting aspect of Spitzer’s 
market timing settlement with Alliance); Langevoort, supra note 34, at 891 
(“The dangers of state criminal prosecution, especially on the fairly loose 
standards of something like New York’s Martin Act, are disabling enough to 
give prosecutors leverage on matters of industry conduct that those in the in-
dustry would otherwise resist. Local state-level politics should not determine 
basic policies in the securities industry. Thus, Congress always has a princi-
pled argument for removing particular matters from state authority.”); Cassi-
dy, supra note 112 at 54, 56 (discussing Spitzer’s initial plan to call for a com-
plete separation of analysts from investment bankers as part of his research 
settlements); see also Allan Chernoff, WorldCom Case Ignites Turf Battle, 
CNN.COM (Aug. 27, 2003), http://edition.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/08/27/us 
.worldcom/index.html (discussing the federal government’s complaint that Ok-
lahoma’s prosecution of WorldCom could “impede and delay the administra-
tion of justice” in parallel federal proceedings). 
 or that its mere existence would dampen state interest in 
filling federal enforcement vacuums in the first place. 
 235. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the 
Treasury Have a Better Idea, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 780 (2009); see also COMM. 
ON CAPITAL MKTS REGULATION, supra note 99, at 68–69 (recommending the 
SEC be given final say on settlements negotiated by state regulators when 
they involve structural remedies concerning matters of national importance). 
 236. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.  
 237. Although, as Professors Coffee and Sale point out, the publicity that 
would surround a veto decision would discourage such behavior. Coffee & Sale, 
supra note 236, at 781. I have similarly proposed that the SEC should be given 
veto authority over Rule 10b-5 class actions, though under my proposal the 
SEC would act at the beginning rather than the end of the litigation. See Rose, 
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A set of more modest—and politically feasible—reforms 
could be imagined that would help quell state overreaching, as 
well as increase the overall efficiency of the U.S. securities 
fraud enforcement regime. For example, a state regulator uti-
lizing his or her preserved authority under NSMIA might be 
required to simultaneously send a copy of any subpoena, re-
quest for information, or other discovery demand it issues in 
connection with an investigation of a public company to the 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement. States might also be required to 
report to the SEC in advance their intention to initiate formal 
enforcement proceedings against a public company and any 
plan to resolve such proceedings through settlement, as well as 
the basis for their decision.238
These requirements would not impose significant burdens 
on state regulators, nor disrupt the potential for states to act as 
a counterweight to a captured SEC. But by fostering communi-
cation early on and throughout the investigative process, they 
may lead to greater cooperation and coordination between state 
and federal regulators than was evidenced in the state actions 
disclosed in the dataset. If the SEC, for example, believed that 
a proposed course of action by a state regulator was misguided, 
the envisioned notice requirements would give it the opportuni-
ty to convince the state regulator of the legitimacy of its view 
or, if that failed, to take its case to the media or Congress.
  
239
 
supra note 99, at 1358 (explaining how transparency and accountability could 
be built into such a regime). 
 As 
noted in Part II.B.4, these sorts of requirements are common in 
concurrent enforcement regimes involving federal law, and 
 238. Others have made narrower recommendations in a similar vein. See, 
e.g., Lane, supra note 231, at 320 (arguing that states should be required “to 
notify and consult with the SEC in the event they seek to enact remedies that 
would have a nationwide impact”). 
 239. The notion that a politically ambitious state regulator would be open 
to persuasion by the SEC may seem Pollyannaish, but even Eliot Spitzer was 
talked down on occasion from some of his more grandiose ideas. See, e.g., Cas-
sidy, supra note 112, at 71 (observing that Spitzer, in connection with his in-
vestigation of biased analyst research at large Wall Street brokerage houses, 
abandoned his initial call for a complete separation of analysts from invest-
ment bankers, thus showing “himself more willing to compromise than many 
people on Wall Street had anticipated”); see also Patrick O’Gilfoil Healy, 
Spitzer, In A Shift, Will Yield Inquiries to U.S. Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
25, 2004, at A1 (recounting that Spitzer, after announcing his bid for governor 
of New York, decided to cede his investigations to federal regulators, stating 
“he was concerned that 50 different investigations would balkanize regula-
tions, and add[ing] that once-lax federal agencies had become more aggressive 
about rooting out fraud and wrongdoing”). 
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there is no good reason why similar safeguards should not exist 
in this context. 
A bolder initiative that would dampen the ability of state 
enforcers to distort federal policy would be to preempt state se-
curities fraud laws as applied to nationally traded firms, while 
granting state enforcers authority to enforce federal fraud pro-
hibitions.240 As discussed in Part II.B.2, preserving just a state 
enforcement role may be more important in checking federal 
enforcement laxity than preserving a state lawmaking role, and 
it would limit the ability of states to undermine national goals 
through aberrant statutes such as the Martin Act.241
The goal here is not to provide concrete policy prescrip-
tions, but rather to stimulate a conversation on how the con-
current state-federal securities fraud enforcement regime 
might be made more effective.
 Mean-
while, states could still leverage local resource- and knowledge-
based advantages, as well as provide an additional outlet for 
citizen influence. While less politically feasible than the other 
structural reforms mentioned above, this proposal warrants 
further consideration.  
242 The empirical evidence de-
scribed above makes clear that room for improvement exists, 
and thus invites policymakers to consider the possibility of in-
cremental reforms.243
 
 240. This approach would be easier to administer than preempting state 
securities fraud laws only if, and to the extent that, they diverge from federal 
law, as some have advocated. See, e.g., Securities Fraud Deterrence and Inves-
tor Restitution Act, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003); Steve A. Radom, Balkani-
zation of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal Preemption, 39 TEX. J. 
BUS. L. 295, 319–20 (2003). 
 
 241. Supra Part II.B.2.  
 242. Among other things, further thought should be given to the potential 
unintended consequences of the mentioned reforms. Would early notice re-
quirements, for example, lead to more reasoned enforcement policy as sug-
gested above, or instead provoke a potentially undesirable enforcement re-
sponse by an SEC afraid of being overshadowed? Cf. Stephen Choi et al., 
Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investiga-
tions 4, 32 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper, Working Paper No. 11-20, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1876725 (finding empirical support for the hypothesis that the SEC pursued 
more marginal investigations into options backdating as the media frenzy sur-
rounding that scandal persisted, at the expense of pursuing other more egre-
gious securities law violations). 
 243. As I have argued elsewhere, consolidating enforcement authority in a 
single federal regulator should also be considered, but only alongside “reforms 
to align the federal enforcer’s incentives more closely with the public interest 
(so as to offset any increased risk of under-deterrence this change might intro-
duce).” Rose, supra note 24, at 2228. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Concurrent state-federal enforcement regimes should be 
neither celebrated nor lambasted in the abstract. Such regimes 
can create important benefits as well as produce significant 
costs. To determine whether they do more good than harm, or 
vice versa, requires an examination of the regulatory context. 
Such an examination demands more, however, than an ad 
hoc—and potentially outcome driven—weighing of amorphous 
costs and benefits. This Article has offered the tools needed to 
conduct such an examination in a disciplined way, allowing 
scholars to draw principled distinctions between concurrent en-
forcement’s value in disparate legal settings. It has identified 
the contextual factors that influence the magnitude of the costs 
and benefits potentially produced by concurrent enforcement, 
including the reason for federal regulation, the breadth of the 
substantive prohibition being enforced, whether states are en-
forcing federal law or analogous state laws, the number of 
states with overlapping jurisdiction, and the type of safeguards 
built into the concurrent enforcement regime. It has also high-
lighted the need for empirical research to better understand 
how both federal and state enforcers can be expected to use 
their enforcement authority—which, at the end of the day, is 
key to determining concurrent enforcement’s desirability. To 
illustrate these points, this Article has provided a detailed—
and empirically grounded—case study of concurrent enforce-
ment of securities fraud laws against nationally traded firms. 
While that case study cannot answer definitively whether con-
current state enforcement in the securities fraud context is de-
sirable, it does reveal that state enforcement has produced both 
social costs and social benefits, and supports nuanced reforms 
likely to improve the efficacy of the enforcement regime going 
forward. 
